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ARTICLES
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
PRIVATIZATION OF RELIGION
Richard S. Myers*
The nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to succeed Justice Thurgood
Marshall generated a great deal of controversy. Surprisingly, much of the
early debate focused on Judge Thomas' religion. As is typical with recent
Supreme Court nominees with Catholic backgrounds,' some critics ques-
tioned whether the nominee would promise that his "religious" views would
not affect his discharge of justice.' Virginia Governor Douglas Wilder
graphically framed the issue by stating: "The question is, 'How much alle-
giance is there to the Pope?' "" Although Governor Wilder quickly apolo-
gized amid a storm of criticism, Senator Orrin Hatch thought Wilder had
* Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. The
author would like to thank Gerry Bradley, George Dent, Mel Durchslag, Jon Entin, Peter
Gerhart, Fred Gedicks, Erik Jensen, Hal Krent, Bill Marshall, Kevin McMunigal, Mollie
Murphy, and Mike Solimine for reading earlier drafts and offering helpful comments and sug-
gestions. The author would also like to thank Tom Fullmer for research assistance.
1. See generally Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Reli-
gion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047 (1990) (focusing on the public
discussion associated with the appointments of Roman Catholic Justices to the Supreme
Court). Although Thomas was raised as a Catholic, he now attends an Episcopal church.
Wilder Apologizes on Thomas Remark, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1991, at A9, C7 [hereinafter Wil-
der Apologizes].
2. See Levinson, supra note 1, at 1062-65 (discussing the confirmation hearings of Jus-
tices Brennan, Scalia, and Kennedy). During the confirmation hearings for his position on the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Judge Thomas was asked
about a comment he had made that appeared to endorse school prayer. Judge Thomas
responded:
I, in a policy context, indicated my personal views on the issue of religious values.
Those were my personal views. As a circuit court judge or a lower court judge, I am
duty bound to apply Supreme Court precedence [sic] on this and other issues and
certainly it is my full intent to do so, and my personal views are inconsequential in
that process.
Confirmation Hearing on Clarence Thomas to be a Judge on the US. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia: Hearing Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 56
(1990).
3. David S. Broder, Wilder Urges Scrutiny of Thomas on Abortion, Religion Impels Ques-
tioning, Governor Says, WASH. POST, July 3, 1991, at A14.
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raised an appropriate subject' and another politician stated that Wilder had
raised an issue that was "probably on the minds of a lot of people."
5
Another area in which religion has become the center of controversy is
child care, which has become a contentious political issue in the last few
years. Major philosophical disagreements have developed regarding the
most desirable forms of public assistance for child care. The question of
whether religiously affiliated child care facilities should be eligible for gov-
ernment funding has become one of the most vigorously debated issues.
Some people argue that these facilities should be excluded from all federally
funded programs or that their participation ought to be contingent upon
elimination of the religious dimensions of their programs.6
The Roman Catholic hierarchy has been increasingly vigilant about in-
structing Catholic political candidates and officials about their religious obli-
gations regarding abortion. In response to one such effort-Bishop Maher's
denial of Communion to a pro-abortion political candidate-a New York
Times editorial warned, "[T]o force religious discipline on public officials
risks destroying the fragile accommodations that Americans of all faiths and
no faith have built with the bricks of the Constitution and the mortar of
4. Donald P. Baker & David S. Broder, Wilder in Hot Water, WASH. POST, July 4, 1991,
at Cl.
5. Wilder Apologizes supra note 1, at A9, C7 (quoting a comment made by Virginia State
Senator Emilie F. Miller).
6. See generally Lee Boothby, The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment and Their Impact on National Child Care Legislation, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 549
(1989); John A. Liekweg, Participation of Religious Providers in Federal Child Care Legisla-
tion: Unrestricted Vouchers are a ConstitutionalAlternative, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 565 (1989);
John W. Whitehead, Accommodation and Equal Treatment of Religion: Federal Funding of
Religiously-Affiliated Child Care Facilities, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 573 (1989). Congress en-
acted the Child Care and Development Block Grant Act as part of the Omnibus Budget Rec-
onciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, §§ 5081-5082, 104 Stat. 1388, 2017. The Act
provides two forms of financial assistance--direct grants to child care providers and certifi-
cates given to parents for use as payment for child care services. Section 658M(a) of the Act
provides that "[n]o financial assistance provided under this subchapter.., shall be expended
for any sectarian purpose or activity, including sectarian worship or instruction." The Senate
report interpreted this provision as requiring that any child care provider receiving financial
assistance eliminate all religious aspects of its program. S. REP. No. 17, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
48-49 (1989). As noted by the Minority Views of Senators Coats, Cochran, and Thurmond,
this interpretation would prohibit prayer before meals, religious symbols and displays, and
even Christmas or Hanukkah programs. See id. at 71. On June 6, 1991, the Department of
Health and Human Services issued an interim final rule that departed substantially from the
approach set forth in the Senate report. Child Care and Development Block Grant, 56 Fed.
Reg. 26,194 (1991). According to the interim final rule, § 658M(a) only prohibits using direct
grants for sectarian activities; "[t]his prohibition does not apply to certificates and providers
may carry out any sectarian activities without restricting their eligibility for certificates under
the Block Grant program." 56 Fed. Reg. at 26, 212.
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tolerance."' 7 A commentary in the Philadelphia Inquirer was even more di-
rect. In response to the decision by Catholic bishops to discipline Catholic
public officials who dissent from Church teachings, the commentary warned
about the concern that such pressure would "reawaken[] all the old religious
prejudices and fears that once inflamed American politics."' The commen-
tary continued with this blunt message: "The Roman Catholic Church, it
needs to be remembered, is quite literally an un-American institution."9 The
appropriate balance between church and state can be maintained only if the
bishops "refrain from using their spiritual authority in the political arena."1
These seemingly disparate events reflect a common theme: Religion is a
private affair that should not play a role in public life. This theme, the priva-
tization of religion, is common in our legal discourse. As Professor Greena-
walt has stated, "My [religious] convictions tell me that no aspect of life
should be wholly untouched by the transcendent reality in which I believe,
yet a basic premise of common legal argument is that any reference to such a
perspective is out of bounds."" The religious exclusion exists, at least in
part, because many participants in these debates "display a hostility or skep-
tical indifference to religion that amounts to a thinly disguised contempt for
belief in any reality beyond that discoverable by scientific inquiry and ordi-
nary human experience."' 2 The privatization thesis has not gone unchal-
lenged. For example, Richard John Neuhaus argues against the view "that
would exclude religion and religiously grounded values from the conduct of
public business."13 Yet, despite such challenges, our legal culture reinforces
the Supreme Court's conclusion that "[t]he Constitution decrees that reli-
gion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institu-
tions of private choice."'
14
7. The Bishop and the Truce of Tolerance, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1989, § 4, at 12. For a
critical commentary on this view, see Richard J. Neuhaus, Those Turbulent Bishops, NAT'L
REv., Dec. 31, 1989, at 32-33.
8. David R. Boldt, The Bishops Return to a Darker Era of US. Politics, PHIL. INQUIRER,
July 1, 1990, at D7.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 5 (1988).
12. Id. at 6; see Frederick M. Gedicks, Some Political Implications of Religious Belief, 4
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 419, 423-25 (1990) (making the same point and
citing other authorities).
13. RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA vii (1984).
14. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971). See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIED-
MAN, THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE (1990). Friedman discusses how religion has been affected
by the republic of choice: "religion is an individual choice, a private not a public matter." Id.
at 165. In addition, Friedman notes that "church-state law, the tangle of First Amendment
1991]
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It is not surprising, therefore, that the privatization thesis has played an
important role in constitutional law in areas that involve the evolving rela-
tionship between religion and the legal order. There has not, however, been
much explicit attention to this phenomenon by legal scholars. The most im-
portant work has been done by Professor Gerard Bradley. Bradley argues
that, in the context of the religion clauses, "[t]he Court is now clearly com-
mitted to articulating and enforcing a normative scheme of 'private' religion
S .,15 This Article shall demonstrate that Bradley's argument overstates
the success of the privatization thesis in influencing First Amendment
doctrine.
Moreover, most of the remaining work in this area focuses too narrowly
on cases involving the religion clauses.16 This focus ignores substantive due
process cases, which more clearly reveal the Justices' understanding of the
relationship between religion and the legal order. There have been impor-
tant discussions concerning the relationship between religious convictions
and lawmaking, and these discussions have focused on the issues raised by
the substantive due process cases.17 Yet most of this work is philosophical
and disclaims any linkage to constitutional doctrine." In short, there is no
comprehensive analysis of the success of the privatization thesis in influenc-
ing constitutional doctrine involving the interaction of religion and the legal
order.
This Article seeks to fill this gap. It examines the privatization thesis
through a discussion of the Establishment Clause19 and of substantive due
process.2 ° In both contexts, religion is typically involved in an explicitly
cases, for all their difficulties and asymmetries, follow the contours of the general legal cul-
ture." Id. at 168; see also Gedicks, supra note 12, at 423-25.
15. Gerard V. Bradley, Dogmatomachy-A "Privatization" Theory of the Religion Clause
Cases, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 275, 276-77 (1986) [hereinafter Bradley, Dogmatomachy]; see also
Gerard Bradley, Tribe's "Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses," 4 BENCHMARK 137, 150
(1990) [hereinafter Bradley, Tribe's Jurisprudence]; cf Gerard Bradley, Caesar's Religion, 15
HUM. LIFE REV. 52 (1989) (making a similar point in the substantive due process context).
16. See Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 Sup. CT.
REV. 83. This extremely valuable article discusses the Justices' views of religion but ignores
completely the substantive due process cases.
17. See GREENAWALT, supra note 11, at 87-97, 120-43 (discussing government prohibi-
tions of consensual sexual acts and abortion).
18. Professor Garvey, in a critique of one of Professor Greenwalt's articles, see Kent
Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV. 352 (1985), noted that
.,we're not talking about constitutional law." John H. Garvey, A Comment on Religious Con-
victions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1288, 1292 n.13 (1986). But see GREENAWALT,
supra note 11, at 244-60 (discussing constitutional issues in a summary matter).
19. The Establishment Clause states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion." U.S. CONsT. amend. I.
20. For an extended discussion of substantive due process doctrine, see Richard S. Myers,
The End of Substantive Due Process?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557 (1988).
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public role. For example, many Establishment Clause issues involve aid to
religious institutions. The constitutional debate in these cases often turns on
whether it is permissible for the religious institution to play an active role in
performing a "public" task, such as education or child care. The privatiza-
tion thesis requires that institutions retaining their religious character be de-
nied direct government support. Similarly, in the context of substantive due
process it is important to determine the appropriate role of religiously influ-
enced moral principles in public decisionmaking on such issues as abortion
and homosexual conduct. Here, the privatization thesis works in two ways.
First, religiously influenced moral judgments are not taken into account in
support of the constitutionality of legislation because such judgments do not
constitute "secular" interests that the government may advance. Second,
religiously influenced moral judgments are viewed as dispositive of the case
against the constitutionality of legislation because it violates the Establish-
ment Clause for "religious" views to be embodied in secular legislation.
This Article largely excludes free exercise cases."' This is not because
these cases are unimportant;22 in fact, the free exercise cases tell us a great
deal about how the Supreme Court Justices view their responsibility to pro-
tect the rights of religious minorities and, more broadly, how they conceive
of their judicial role.2" The Article excludes these cases because free exercise
issues typically do not involve religion in a "public role." Rather, the free
exercise claimant is typically seeking an exemption from some expression of
"public order." Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith,2 4 where the Court considered whether the Free Exercise Clause re-
quired that the religious use of peyote be exempted from the criminal
prohibitions on the use of that drug, is a good example.25
In fact, the free exercise cases reveal that the Justices who support the
privatization thesis are not hostile to religion. These Justices are quite will-
ing to support free exercise claimants. The privatization thesis simply rejects
a public role for religion. The thesis is not hostile to religion in general;
rather, it is hostile to a particular type of religion.
21. But see infra Section II.B (discussing the free exercise issue).
22. Professor McConnell has stated that "[t]he free exercise clause may well be the most
philosophically interesting and distinctive feature of the American Constitution." Michael W.
McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV.
L. REV. 1409, 1513 (1990).
23. See generally James D. Gordon, III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CALIF. L.
REV. 91 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. Cr. REV. 1;
Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV.
1109 (1990).
24. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
25. Id. at 875.
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This Article argues that in order to best understand the doctrinal debates
surrounding the Establishment Clause and substantive due process, it is nec-
essary to focus on the Justices' understanding of the role of religion2 6 in
public life. The sharp divisions on the Supreme Court in these two areas
reflect in part the Justices' different conceptions as to the proper role of reli-
gion in public life. A narrow focus on the legal doctrine risks obscuring this
more fundamental, theoretical issue.
The Article does not suggest that the Justices' views of the role of religion
in public life explain every decision concerning the Establishment Clause or
substantive due process. This Article is not intended to take a reductionist
view or to fail to acknowledge the complexities of the cases. Other factors,
such as precedent or a Justice's view of the deference owed to the democrati-
cally-elected branches, also play a prominent role. Nonetheless, the Justices'
opinions of the privatization thesis provide a useful perspective on the case
law.
The Article examines both the Establishment Clause and the substantive
due process doctrine. Recently there has been a welcome shift away from
the view that religion should be privatized. The legal doctrine has shifted
towards the view that religion, broadly conceived, has a valuable role to play
in the public realm.
This Article argues that this change is salutary. Accepting a public role
for religion is most faithful to this country's tradition of religious activism in
public life. In addition, accepting a public role for religion enables religious
institutions to contribute significant resources and insights regarding moral
issues. Moreover, accepting a public role for religion preserves the strength
of a key mediating institution, which plays an essential role in maintaining
the health and freedom of society.
The Article also suggests how the current doctrine should be reformulated
to allow religion to play a more active public role. The Article explains that
the Supreme Court should modify the way it treats cases involving the public
funding of religious institutions. Although the Court is increasingly sympa-
thetic to including religious institutions in publicly funded programs, current
26. The phrase "role of religion," refers to religious institutions, religious individuals, and
religiously-influenced moral principles. By "religiously-influenced moral principles" the Arti-
cle adopts what Professor Bradley refers to as the notion of "religious consciousness," that is,
"the conviction that religion contains objectively true insights into human social existence."
Bradley, Dogmatomachy, supra note 15, at 277. Put another way, a "religiously-influenced
moral principle" is simply one type of moral knowledge, a type of moral knowledge that is in
some sense traced to or influenced by the religious beliefs of the individual or church in ques-
tion. See Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932,




Establishment Clause doctrine still discourages these institutions from main-
taining a strong religious identity. Finally, this Article contends that Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine should be modified to eliminate this latter
tendency. Religious institutions, if they choose to be, ought to be full par-
ticipants in public programs such as education or child care. Allowing these
institutions to preserve their religious identities is particularly important as
the government continues to increase its role in areas that traditionally have
been the province of mediating institutions.
I. THE RELIGION CLAUSES
This section of the Article discusses the influence of the privatization the-
sis on both Establishment Clause and free exercise doctrine. Part A dis-
cusses the three areas in which the privatization thesis has influenced
Establishment Clause doctrine. First, courts frequently find Establishment
Clause violations when the government assists religious institutions, on the
theory that the government may not take actions having the primary effect
of advancing religion. The problem has arisen predominantly in the context
of government funding to religious schools. The judicial decisions evidence
a hostility to religious institutions playing an active role in performing a
"public" task, such as education. In effect, this has "encouraged" religious
institutions to abandon their distinctive, religious identities and penalized
the individuals who attend schools that have retained such distinctive identi-
ties. Second, courts sometimes find Establishment Clause violations when
religious symbols are displayed on public property. The concern here is to
insulate government from religious symbols and practices so that it adheres
to "the constitutional command of secular government."27 Third, the Court
occasionally holds statutes unconstitutional because they lack a "secular
purpose." That is, a law that is otherwise valid is struck down if enacted
with the purpose of advancing religion. In each of these three areas, the
Article explores the deficiencies of the privatization thesis and suggests how
Establishment Clause doctrine should be modified to eliminate the influence
of the privatization thesis.
In Part B of this section, the Article briefly discusses free exercise doc-
trine. This discussion supports the view that most of the Justices have a
consistent understanding of the role of religion in public life that is mani-
fested across doctrinal lines. The sharp divisions among the Justices on free
exercise issues reflect different understandings of the role of religion in public
life.
27. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 611 (1989).
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In free exercise cases, religion is not involved in a public role; the free
exercise claimant is typically seeking an exemption from some expression of
public order. Thus, it is not an anomaly that the Justices who support the
privatization thesis are quite willing to support free exercise claimants.
These "pro-religion" votes illustrate that the liberal Justices are not anti-
religious. These Justices are, instead, hostile to a particular type of religion,
namely, public religion. For the liberal members of the Court, votes in sup-
port of free exercise claims reflect an individualistic conception of religion
which similarly influences their positions on Establishment Clause and sub-
stantive due process issues.
A. The Establishment Clause
1. Public Funding Of Religious Institutions
Ever since Everson v. Board of Education,2" the issue of public funding of
religious schools has dominated Establishment Clause litigation. The Court
never accepted the extreme position that the Establishment Clause barred all
public assistance to religious schools.29 It has allowed some forms of assist-
ance, such as bus transportation and textbooks.30 The dominant view on the
Court, however, prohibits significant direct assistance to religious schools.
This position in part reflects the separationist emphasis of the test developed
in Lemon v. Kurtzman,3 1 although separationist theories are not necessarily
hostile to a public role for religion. 2 The principal justification for the
28. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
29. Justice Rutledge's dissent in Everson would have prohibited virtually all public aid to
religious schools. Id. at 28 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). For a discussion and defense of Justice
Rutledge's position, see G. Sidney Buchanan, Governmental Aid to Religious Entities: The To-
tal Subsidy Position Prevails, 58 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 53, 71-73 (1989); G. Sidney Buchanan,
Governmental Aid to Sectarian Schools: A Study in Corrosive Precedents, 15 Hous. L. REv.
783, 827-38 (1978).
30. For a discussion of the public funding cases, see John Garvey, Another Way of Look-
ing at School Aid, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 61; Douglas Laycock, A Survey of Religious Liberty in
the United States, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 409, 443-49 (1986) [hereinafter Laycock, Religious Lib-
erty]; Michael W. McConnell, Political and Religious Disestablishment, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV.
405; Kenneth F. Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion Clauses: A Ten Year Assess-
ment, 27 UCLA L. REV. 1195 (1980); Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1675-703 (1987).
31. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
32. See Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular" Reconstructing the Disestablish-
ment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955 (1989); Richard S. Myers, The Establishment Clause and
Nativity Scenes: A Reassessment of Lynch v. Donnelly, 77 Ky. L.J. 61 (1988) [hereinafter My-
ers, Nativity Scenes]. Since 1971, the Supreme Court has used the Lemon test to analyze Es-
tablishment Clause issues. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). According to the
Lemon test, a statute must pass three requirements in order to withstand an Establishment
Clause challenge: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its princi-
pal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
[Vol. 41:19
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Court's approach has been that the government may not take actions that
have the primary effect of advancing religion.
The privatization thesis has played an important role in this context.
Nevertheless, despite the thesis' importance, it does not perfectly elucidate
the ambiguities in the case law on public funding of religious institutions.33
In fact, one might argue that the predominant influence in this area has been
the country's long opposition to government support of religion with tax
dollars, 34 and that this opposition does not reflect a desire to privatize reli-
gion. In contrast, the view that the government should not provide direct
financial assistance to religion has been historically associated with strong
proponents of religious liberty, who argue that the aid may corrupt the
church.35 Under this view, there is no objection to religious institutions
playing an active public role, they are simply required to pay their own
way. 36
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' " Id. at 612-13 (citation
omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). The status of Lemon is
precarious. Although the Court continues to formally adhere to the Lemon test in resolving
Establishment Clause cases, see Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356, 2370-73 (1990)
(plurality opinion); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 & n.44 (1989), it has
increasingly used the "endorsement" concept advocated by Justice O'Connor. See id. at 593-
94. As the separate opinions in County of Allegheny indicate, however, the Justices who sup-
port the endorsement test do not agree on what it means. In recent years, the Lemon test has
come under increasing attack from certain members of the Court. See, e.g., id. at 655-63
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting criticisms of Lemon and pro-
posing a test that focuses more on coercion). In Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir.
1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305 (1991), the Court will consider whether to scrap Lemon.
See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court to Take Fresh Look at Disputed Church-State Bound-
ary, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1991, at A16.
33. See Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 30, at 443. Professor Laycock stated that:
Government aid to religious schools has been on the Supreme Court's docket almost
continuously since 1968. The Court has been unwilling either to ban all such aid or
to permit all such aid. Instead, it has groped for a compromise formulation that
would permit some aid but not too much. At least six inconsistent theories have been
endorsed by one or more justices. The majority has switched from one theory to
another more than once. At least four of these theories are plausible. The result has
been a series of inconsistent and almost inexplicable decisions.
Id.
34. See Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential" Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Origi-
nal Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 916-17 (1986) [hereinafter, Laycock, Nonpreferen-
tial Aid] (discussing resistance to tax support for churches).
35. Oliver S. Thomas, Comments on Papers by Milner Ball and Frederick Gedicks, 4 No-
TRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 451, 455 (1990). This view is usually traced to Roger
Williams. See Myers, supra note 32, at 113 & n.242 (discussing this point with respect to the
display of religious symbols on public property and citing authorities).
36. Laycock, Nonpreferential Aid, supra note 34, at 923 ("With respect to money, religion
was to be wholly voluntary. Churches either would support themselves or they would not, but
the government would neither help nor interfere.").
1991]
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Although the latter view has played a role in the public funding cases, it
would be a mistake to ignore the impact of the privatization thesis on certain
Justices. For example, although citations to Madison's Memorial and Re-
monstrance abound in the public funding cases,37 it is anachronistic to apply
the prohibition against financial aid to religion in a context such as public
funding of religious schools. In light of the importance of government
spending on education, religious schools' requests for financial aid are more
properly regarded as efforts to obtain equal treatment than as a special
pleading for subsidies.
The Justices who have most consistently opposed government funding of
religious schools have in other contexts been the most sensitive to the impact
of government funding on the exercise of constitutional rights. For example,
Justice Brennan's dissents in the abortion funding cases were quite sensitive
to the government's choice to fund one option (childbirth) over another
(abortion).3" It is hard to avoid thinking that his response to the govern-
ment's failure to fund either religious education or abortion reflects his sym-
pathy to the underlying rights.39
37. See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, re-
printed in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 app. (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
For other references to Memorial and Remonstrance, see Committee for Pub. Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760, 770 n.28 (1973) and Lemon v. Kurtzmann, 403
U.S. 602, 633-34 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring).
38. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 329 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 482 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
39. The author does not suggest that Justice Brennan is the only Supreme Court Justice
who treats the selective funding problem inconsistently. As Professor McConnell noted:
[V]irtually everyone who supports funding of abortions opposes funding of religious
schools, and virtually everyone who supports funding of religious schools opposes
funding of abortions. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that, for most people,
these positions are driven more by relative enthusiasm for or hostility to the underly-
ing rights than by a principled understanding of the relation between these rights and
government funding.
Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and Religious Schools, 104
HARV. L. REV. 989, 991 (1991). In addition, it is difficult to believe that Justice Brennan's
views on the public funding cases are explained by his deference to the original understanding
of the Establishment Clause, which it is argued, is best explained by reference to Madison. As
Justice Brennan has explained, he does not consider himself bound by the original understand-
ing. He reads the Constitution "as [a] Twentieth Century American[ ]." William J. Brennan,
Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 43 NAT'L LAW. GUILD
PRAC. 1, 7 (1986). This approach incorporates the Justice's own normative views. See ROB-
ERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 219-21 (1990) (discussing Justice Brennan's judi-
cial philosophy). This all suggests that Justice Brennan thinks that the privatization thesis is a
good idea. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 820 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he courts necessarily have
carved out what they deemed to be the most desirable national policy governing various as-
pects of church-state relationships.").
[Vol. 41:19
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The cases demonstrate that the privatization thesis helps to understand
why certain Justices reject government funding of religious education.
Many judicial opinions on the subject evidence hostility to religious institu-
tions playing an active role in performing a "public" task, namely, educa-
tion.i ° These decisions encourage religious schools to abandon their
distinctive, religious identities and in effect penalize the religious individuals
who attend schools that have retained their distinctive identities. While the
doctrine has improved over the years, it still needs substantial modification.
Many of the school aid cases reflect a negative assessment of religious
schools, as demonstrated by the opinions' persistent references to the
schools' purpose of religious indoctrination and inculcation.41 To the lib-
eral, secular mindset that figures so prominently in these cases, the "authori-
tarian" character of these schools is hardly attractive. Although there may
be some simple anti-Catholicism reflected in certain opinions,42 the Court's
view of religious schools is probably more a reflection of a general antipathy
to the supposedly "irrational," '43 freedom-restraining, undemocratic" char-
acter of traditional religion. Because Pierce v. Society of Sisters45 has not
40. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("Today, education is perhaps
the most important function of state and local governments.").
41. See, e.g., School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 388 (1985); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616; id. at 631, 635 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
42. See Smith, supra note 16, at 105; James Hitchcock, Church, State, and Moral Values:
The Limits of American Pluralism, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 3, 9-10 (Spring 1981).
43. See Suzanna Sherry, Outlaw Blues, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1418, 1427 (1989) ("[S]uch
things as divine revelation and biblical literalism are irrational superstitious nonsense."). Pro-
fessor Levinson suggests that Sherry's comment is "a more old-fashioned, though one suspects
not completely atypical" example "of the Enlightenment-based animus within the intellectual
community to religion." Levinson, supra note 1, at 1078 n.90. See generally Steven G. Gey,
Why is Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. Pnrr. L. REv. 75, 176 (1990) ("[R]eligion is an alterna-
tive system of nonrational and unprovable beliefs. As such, religion is fundamentally incom-
patible with the critical rationality on which democracy depends.").
44. See Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 242 (1963) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring) ("The choice which is thus preserved is between a public secular education with its
uniquely democratic values, and some form of private or sectarian education, which offers
values of its own."); see also Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 215-17,
231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
45. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the State could not require all children to be edu-
cated only in public schools). Although the courts have preserved the rights of parents to opt
out of the public schools, the courts have otherwise not been sympathetic to the rights of
parents to control the education of their children. See generally Richard S. Myers, Curricu-
lum in the Public Schools: The Need for an Emphasis on Parental Control, 24 VAL. U. L. REV.
431 (1990) [hereinafter Myers, Curriculum].
19911
Catholic University Law Review
been overturned, religious schools must be tolerated.4 6 The Court would
not, however, sanction significant, direct assistance to these schools. On the
other hand, in the higher education cases the Court was much more willing
to allow substantial, direct aid to religiously affiliated colleges and universi-
ties. Because these schools were viewed as essentially secular,47 they did not
present the dangers of organized religion.48
Another aspect of the early school aid cases also reflects the privatization
thesis. In Lemon, for example, the Court expressed concern that the Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania programs of assistance to private schools might
lead to "[p]olitical fragmentation and divisiveness on religious lines."49
Those who sought state assistance for parochial schools were inappropriately
"intruding into the political arena."50 This involvement in the political pro-
cess was an example of religion not respecting its proper, private place. In
fact, this involvement in the democratic process was undemocratic.5 1
46. "Tolerance", in the sense of a grudging concession to a practice of which one disap-
proves, see Steven D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REV. 305, 306 (1990), is
the way to describe the attitude of certain Justices towards religious schools. Justice Brennan's
comparison of public and private schools in Schempp is interesting.
It is implicit in the history and character of American public education that the
public schools serve a uniquely public function: the training of American citizens in
an atmosphere free of parochial, divisive, or separatist influences of any sort-an
atmosphere in which children may assimilate a heritage common to all American
groups and religions. This is a heritage neither theistic nor atheistic, but simply civic
and patriotic.
374 U.S. at 241-42 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted). The Court's enthusiasm for
government indoctrination and distrust for religious indoctrination is instructive. It now
seems generally recognized that the public schools are not religiously neutral. See Myers,
Curriculum, supra note 45, at 432 & n.6. Some explicitly defend the role of the public schools
in indoctrination, see Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Reli-
gion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 298 (1989); William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offen-
siveness in Establishment and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J. 351, 367-73 (1991),
even when there are religious objections to government indoctrination. See Myers, Curricu-
lum, supra note 45, at 436-39 (criticizing this conclusion). Justice Brennan is not always so
solicitous of public school's pedagogical message. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 280 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
47. See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743-44 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672, 687 (1971); see Joseph R. Preville, Catholic Colleges and the Supreme Court: The
Case ofTilton v. Richardson, 30 J. CHURCH & ST. 291, 306-07 (1988) (discussing how the four
colleges involved in Tilton were secularized during the course of the lawsuit). In Tilton, the
Court also noted "that college students are less impressionable and less susceptible to religious
indoctrination" than students in elementary and secondary schools. 403 U.S. at 686. The
Court seems to be concerned that the religious mission of parochial schools might actually
influence younger students.
48. Of course, some Justices objected to all direct aid to religious institutions. See Tilton,
403 U.S. at 689-93 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
49. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971).
50. Id.
51. In Lemon, Justice Burger wrote:
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The Court maintained that although religion can be valuable, it must be
confined to its proper realm-the private sphere.52 Religious groups' efforts
to influence the political agenda are viewed as distortions of the democratic
process and in certain instances are regarded as violations of the Establish-
ment Clause.53
Thus, two factors suggest that the privatization thesis has influenced cer-
tain Justices. First, certain opinions indicate grave reservations about the
character of the schools. Although parochial schools were to be tolerated,
their undemocratic character suggested that they should be regarded with
some suspicion, at least when it came to distributing public resources. Sec-
ond, the influence of the political divisiveness test, which is most often in-
voked in public funding cases,54 indicates that certain Justices are not
favorably disposed to religious activism in politics. This suggests, again, that
certain Justices are not sympathetic to the underlying rights being
asserted.55
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are nor-
mal and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government, but polit-
ical division along religious lines was one of the principal evils against which the
First Amendment was intended to protect. The potential divisiveness of such conflict
is a threat to the normal political process.
403 U.S. at 622 (citation omitted). Chief Justice Burger seemed to be less enamored with the
political divisiveness test in subsequent years. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 385-
86 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 664-85 (1984).
52. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625.
53. For a discussion of the divisiveness doctrine, see GERARD V. BRADLEY, CHURCH-
STATE RELATIONSHIPS IN AMERICA 4-9 (1987); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1275-84 (2d ed. 1988); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 1192-97 (4th ed. 1991); Carl H. Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should It Be Retained,
Reformulated or Rejected?, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 513, 528-29 (1990);
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Political Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement
of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U. L.J. 205 (1980).
54. But see Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 571 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (invoking the divisiveness doctrine in the abortion
context).
55. The abortion rights situation presents an illuminating contrast. In that setting, the
Court is typically unconcerned about the bitter disputes engendered by the vindication of abor-
tion rights. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 772 (1986). Yet, efforts to vindicate the religious liberty of parents who have a religious
obligation to send their children to parochial schools are viewed as dangerous incursions into
the normal political process. See Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 256 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 258-59 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Meek, 421 U.S. at 374-85 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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Although the Court's direction appeared to change somewhat in the early
1980s,56 the 1984 Term brought "a return to separationist doctrine."' 7 Two
school aid cases, School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball58 and Aguilar v.
Felton,59 were major victories for the privatization thesis. In Aguilar, the
Court's holding that it is unconstitutional for public school professionals to
provide remedial education to needy children on the premises of private reli-
gious schools severely disadvantaged needy inner-city families.' Aguilar pe-
nalized poor families who decided to educate their children in religious
schools; parents who sent their children to religious schools were required to
forfeit their statutory entitlement to the remedial services that would have
been available to their children had they attended public schools.
Again, the 1985 school aid cases reflect the Court's view that religion
should not play an active role in public life. Justice Brennan's opinion in
Grand Rapids clearly reflected the view that religion should be confined to
the private, spiritual realm. He stated:
[J]ust as religion throughout history has provided spiritual com-
fort, guidance, and inspiration to many, it can also serve
powerfully to divide societies and to exclude those whose beliefs
56. See Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra note 32, at 91 & n. 153.
57. Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 2.
58. 473 U.S. 373 (1985). In Grand Rapids, the Court held that two programs, the Shared
Time and Community Education programs, violated the establishment clause. "These pro-
grams . . .provide[d] classes to nonpublic school students at public expense in classrooms
located in and leased from the local nonpublic schools." 473 U.S. at 375. Forty of the forty-
one nonpublic schools involved in the program were religious schools.
59. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). Aguilar involved a federal program that "distribute[s] financial
assistance to local educational institutions to meet the needs of educationally deprived children
from low-income families." 473 U.S. at 404. Aguilar turned on the City of New York's ad-
ministration of the program. Of the low-income students eligible to benefit by the program,
13.2% attended private schools, most of which were religious in character. New York pro-
vided instructional services, such as remedial reading and math, by public school employees to
parochial school students on the premises of the parochial schools.
60. See generally THOMAS VITULLO-MARTIN & BRUCE COOPER, SEPARATION OF
CHURCH AND CHILD: THE CONSTITUTION AND FEDERAL AID TO RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
(1987) (providing a detailed discussion of Aguilar's impact); Patricia Lines, The Entanglement
Prong of the Establishment Clause and the Needy Child in the Private School: Is Distributive
Justice Possible?, 17 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 26-30 (1988). To comply with the Court's ruling, the
government substituted programs that were more expensive and less effective. The programs
typically required that the children be transported to other locations, thus diverting federal
funds from education to payments for transportation and portable classrooms. After Aguilar,
the federal program served far fewer private school children. There has also been continued
litigation about the constitutionality of the post-Aguilar programs. Compare Pulido v.
Cavazos, 934 F.2d 912 (8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to providing
remedial services in mobile units outside the parochial school even though some units were
located on the property of the parochial school) with Walker v. San Francisco Unified Sch.
Dist., 761 F. Supp. 1463 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (concluding that the Establishment Clause prohib-
ited parking mobile units on the property of the parochial school).
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are not in accord with particular religions or sects that have from
time to time achieved dominance. The solution to this problem
adopted by the Framers and consistently recognized by this Court
is jealously to guard the right of every individual to worship ac-
cording to the dictates of conscience while requiring the govern-
ment to maintain a course of neutrality among religions, and
between religion and nonreligion.6 1
While Justice Brennan noted that religious schools have contributed to soci-
ety, he reaffirmed that substantial public support for these institutions could
not be sanctioned because "[t]he Constitution decrees that religion must be a
private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private
choice." 62 In support of his ruling, Justice Brennan also cited the potential
for political divisiveness, 63 a factor also emphasized in Justice Powell's sepa-
rate opinion."
The Establishment Clause decisions involving aid to religious institutions
since 1985 have begun to move away from the privatization thesis. For ex-
ample, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,6 5 the
Court unanimously concluded that it did not violate the Establishment
Clause for the state of Washington to extend financial aid under a state voca-
tional rehabilitation program to a blind man who was studying at a Chris-
tian college to prepare himself for a career as a pastor, missionary, or youth
director. Because the aid went to the individual, "the decision to support
religious education is made by the individual, not by the State." 6  The
assistance was made available without regard to religion, only a small
amount of aid supported religious education, and the assistance "create[d]
no financial incentive for students to undertake sectarian education.",
67
61. Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 382; see also Bradley, Dogmatomachy, supra note 15, at
296.
62. Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 398 (alteration in original) (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at
625).
63. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 414.
64. Id. at 416-17 (Powell, J., concurring).
65. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
66. Id at 488.
67. Id. Witters does not, however, indicate that all of the Justices reject the privatization
thesis. Although the Court was unanimous, the liberal wing of the Court, meaning those Jus-
tices who were in the majority in Grand Rapids and Aguilar, strained to emphasize the limited
nature of its ruling. First, Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, noted the tentative char-
acter of the ruling. He indicated that the record presented was quite limited and that there
were several issues that would need to be addressed on remand. Id. at 486 n.3, 489 & n.5.
Second, the majority emphasized that "no more than a minuscule amount of the aid awarded
under the program is likely to flow to religious education." Id. at 486. Apparently, Witters
was the only person who had ever attempted to use the vocational rehabilitation assistance for
religious education. Id. at 488. The Court emphasized that its ruling did not suggest approval
of significant aid to parochial schools. Id. In fact, for certain Justices, the marginal nature of
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The Court's 1988 decision in Bowen v. Kendrick6" has been the most im-
portant indication that the Court is more receptive to an active role for
religious organizations. The decision, however, illustrates the inadequacies
of the Court's current approach. The Adolescent Family Life Act
(AFLA)6 9 authorizes grants to public and private organizations for services
and research on premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy. One
of the AFLA's goals is to promote chastity. Because it recognized the com-
plexity of the problem and the inadequacy of relying solely on government
solutions, Congress specifically required the involvement of religious and
other private organizations in the program. In fact, AFLA grants were dis-
tributed to religious organizations.
The Court first rejected the conclusion that AFLA was inherently reli-
gious, even though it did promote chastity and adoption as an alternative to
abortion. The Court concluded that AFLA's approach to adolescent sexual-
ity and pregnancy "is not inherently religious, although it may coincide with
the approach taken by certain religions."7 °
The Court then rejected the view that requiring the inclusion of religious
groups in a program involving sensitive issues that may have important reli-
gious implications violated the Establishment Clause. In particular, the
Court stated:
the entire program was crucial because they were unwilling to endorse a significant public role
for religious education. In other words, the Justices who are generally supportive of the priva-
tization thesis are willing to tolerate exceptions, as long as they are innocuous. This supports
Professor Laycock's view that the Court seems to believe "that a little bit of aid to religious
schools is permissible, but it must be structured in a way that keeps it from becoming too
much." Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 30, at 446.
Third, as the separate opinions noted, Justice Marshall carefully avoided any approval of the
Court's ruling in Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), in which the Court, by a 5-4 vote,
sustained a tax deduction for certain educational expenses even though a high percentage of
beneficiaries were parents of children attending religious schools. The omission of favorable
references to Mueller suggests that Justice Marshall, who wrote the dissent in Mueller, did not
intend his opinion in Witters to be a rejection of his longstanding view that the establishment
clause prohibits significant assistance to religious schools. Fourth, the subsequent history of
the Witters litigation (which is usually ignored) suggests that the Supreme Court opinion in
Witters does not indicate that the Justices reject the privatization thesis.
On remand, the Washington Supreme Court held that the Washington constitution prohib-
ited extending the aid for Witters's religious education and that the denial of aid did not violate
the free exercise clause. Witters v. State Comm' for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119 (Wash.), cert
denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989). The Supreme Court denied Witters' petition for a writ of certio-
rari, Witters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 493 U.S. 850 (1989), although Justice
White thought the Court should have agreed to hear the free exercise issue. See McMonagle v.
Northeast Women's Ctr., Inc., 493 U.S. 901 (1989) (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
68. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z to 300z-10 (1988).
70. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 605.
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Nothing in our previous cases prevents Congress from ... recog-
nizing the important part that religion or religious organizations
may play in resolving certain secular problems. . .. [I]t seems
quite sensible for Congress to recognize that religious organiza-
tions can influence values and can have some influence on family
life, including parents' relations with their adolescent children.71
The Court held that the Constitution does not require that religious organi-
zations be excluded "from participating in publicly sponsored social welfare
programs,",7 2 at least when "a significant proportion of the federal funds will
[not] be disbursed to 'pervasively sectarian' institutions.
73
The Court also rejected the lower court's reliance on the "political divi-
siveness" test. The Court stated: "It may well be that because of the impor-
tance of the issues relating to adolescent sexuality there may be a division of
opinion along religious lines as well as other lines. But the same may be said
of a great number of other public issues of our day.
' 74
Justice Blackmun's dissent concluded that it was unconstitutional to use
federal funds "to support religious teaching."'75 More important, the dissent
reflects a negative attitude about religion that has all too frequently charac-
terized Establishment Clause case law. The dissent maintained that the con-
gressional "solicitude for the participation of religious organizations"
76
weighed against the constitutionality of AFLA. The dissent repeatedly re-
ferred to "religious indoctrination" and expressed concern about govern-
ment participation in "educat[ing] impressionable young minds on issues of
religious moment."' 77 While Justice Blackmun expressed concern that reli-
gious organizations not be secularized and demeaned by accepting public
funds with their constitutionally required strings, 78 the overwhelming
message of the dissent is a disdain for the efforts of some AFLA grant
recipients.79
71. Id. at 607.
72. Id. at 609.
73. Id. at 610.
74. Id. at 617 n. 14. The Court also added the obligatory comment that "the question of
'political divisiveness' should be 'regarded as confined to cases where direct financial subsidies
are paid to parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools.'" Id. (quoting Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 404 n.l1 (1983)).
75. Id. at 626 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Stevens.
76. Id. at 637 n.8.
77. Id. at 636, 638 (emphasis added). Despite Justice Blackmun's disclaimer, id. at 634,
he seemed to perceive the issue (i.e., chastity) as inherently religious and therefore not a proper
subject for governmental concern. See, e.g., id. at 639 n.9.
78. Id. at 640 n.10.
79. Id. at 625-26, 635 n.7, 642 n.12.
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Thus, Bowen confirms the important influence the privatization theory has
had on the liberal Justices in Establishment Clause cases. The overwhelming
message of these Justices is that religion is a private affair. Under this view,
religion should be tolerated, but constant vigilance needs to be maintained to
screen religion from any direct influence on public life. Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Bowen echoes the opinions of Justice Douglas, who was extremely
hostile to corporate religion.80 These Justices exhibit this approach on a
whole range of issues involving the interaction between law and religion.
Thus, on substantive due process issues, these Justices predictably have been
the most outspoken about the need to limit the role of religiously-influenced
moral principles. Although theories exist that might explain the Establish-
ment Clause rulings of these Justices, the principal alternative-the "no sub-
sidy to religion view"-seems less persuasive for these Justices. These
Justices, after all, are very sensitive to the impact of government funding on
the exercise of constitutional rights."' The contrast between their Establish-
ment Clause decisions and their decisions involving rights they favor, such
as abortion, along with their other writings on the role of religion, suggests
that the privatization theory has significant explanatory power.
The Court's recent Establishment Clause decisions, Bowen in particular,
reflect the declining influence of the privatization thesis. In this area, as in
others, recent judicial appointees have significantly altered the legal doctrine.
Although it still appears significant for certain Justices, the privatization the-
sis is no longer the dominant influence on Establishment Clause doctrine. s2
Bowen has signalled several important changes in the Establishment
Clause doctrine. For example, Bowen may have eliminated the entangle-
ment prong of the Lemon test.83 Under this prong, the Court had previously
invalidated aid to parochial schools after concluding that the extensive su-
pervision which would be required to prevent the use of such aid for the
promotion of religion would necessarily entail excessive entanglement in vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause. 4 In Bowen, however, the Court virtu-
80. See Smith, supra note 16, at 98-99.
81. See Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759, 1778 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 329 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 337 (Marshall, J., dissenting);
id. at 348 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 349 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Maher v. Roe, 432
U.S. 464, 482 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 454 (1977) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); id. at 462 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
82. Professor Bradley's theory that the Court is committed to privatizing religion, see
Bradley, Dogmatomachy, supra note 15, at 276-77, is overstated, or at least outdated.
Although it does describe accurately the views of certain Justices, the privatization thesis fails
to acknowledge recent important shifts in the Establishment Clause doctrine.
83. See sources cited supra note 32.
84. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409-14 (1985).
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ally abandoned the entanglement prong. The majority cited criticisms of
"entanglement," 85 and then concluded that there was no entanglement prob-
lem because the religious organizations involved were not "'pervasively sec-
tarian' in the same sense as the Court has held parochial schools to be."
8 6
Thus, it can be inferred that the Justices in the majority in Bowen are not
favorably disposed to the entanglement prong, and that it is only a matter of
time before this part of the Lemon test is formally abandoned. 7
In addition, Bowen illustrates that a majority of the Court now rejects a
principal manifestation of the privatization thesis 8 -the political divisive-
ness test.8 9 That test has been virtually ignored in many recent Establish-
ment Clause cases,90 and it now seems apparent that the Court does not
regard the test as having any continuing validity. The Court never really
relied solely upon the political divisiveness test to justify finding an Estab-
lishment Clause violation. Moreover, the Court no longer regards the polit-
ical divisiveness that may be engendered by religious involvement in the
political process as a warning signal of Establishment Clause problems. In-
deed, the Court seems to have rejected the view that political divisiveness
along religious lines is an evil, reasoning that such divisiveness is a normal
part of the political process and is not a cause for concern. 9
The rejection of political divisiveness is well founded, as the divisiveness
rationale has had little historical support.9 2 Although some Framers of the
Constitution were concerned about religious domination,93 their solution
was not to privatize religion.94 The Framers, particularly James Madison,
85. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615-16 (1988).
86. Id. at 616.
87. Moreover, this prong would not be important if the current understanding of the ef-
fect prong is revised, since supervision is necessary only to avoid a violation of the second
prong.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 11-18 (discussing the privatization thesis).
89. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text (discussing the divisiveness test).
90. See, e.g., Bowen, 487 U.S. at 617 n. 14 (rejecting summarily the district court's conclu-
sion that AFLA was unconstitutional because it was likely to lead to political divisiveness);
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 339 n.17 (1987); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683-85 (1984); Muel-
ler v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n.11 (1983).
91. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 617 n.14; see Esbeck, supra note 53, at 528 ("[T]he political divi-
siveness element is now repudiated by a majority of the Court."). The Court does note that the
political divisiveness test is still relevant in " 'cases where direct financial subsidies are paid to
parochial schools or to teachers in parochial schools.'" Bowen, 487 U.S. at 617 n.14 (quoting
Mueller, 463 U.S. at 404 n.ll).
92. See, e.g., BRADLEY, supra note 53, at 4-9; Gaffney, supra note 53.
93. See McConnell, supra note 57, at 14-15.
94. See BRADLEY, supra note 53, at 5; Smith, supra note 32, at 959-75; Myers, Nativity
Scenes, supra note 32, at 97-106 (arguing that the solution to the prospect of religious coercion
was to prevent the development of an institutional relationship between a religious denomina-
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viewed religious factions "as a source of peace and stability."9 5 Likewise,
most of our political history belies any suggestion that legislation is constitu-
tionally suspect simply because religious groups were involved in its passage,
or because particular supporters of the legislation acted out of religious
convictions.
96
In addition, there is little reason today to believe that religious division is
any more contentious than other kinds of divisions, such as those based on
ethnic or racial lines.97 Justice Powell observed that "[t]he risk of significant
religious or denominational control over our democratic processes-or even
of deep political division along religious lines-is remote." 98 A recent work
of one scholar supports Justice Powell's observation. This commentary ex-
amined the declining significance of denominationalism in American religion
and noted that disagreements on controversial issues are more likely to be
between religious liberals and religious conservatives, rather than between
particular religious denominations.99
More important, the Court now seems to recognize that the divisiveness
test is not an appropriate instrument with which to control the country's
political agenda, and that such a role is not really possible, even if it were
desirable. Invoking the Establishment Clause to invalidate legislation on di-
visiveness grounds is not likely to lead to civic peace; rather, it serves only to
shift the locus of discontent."o° In the long run, the Court's involvement
may make things worse."' 1
Bowen does, however, indicate the need for improvement. Although
Bowen confirms that the Establishment Clause does not bar religious organi-
zations from publicly funded programs, there seems to be little enthusiasm
for these organizations maintaining strong religious identities-at least in
the publicly funded program. Although it did allow religious institutions to
tion and the state, from which coercion was likely to flow, not to prevent all contact between
religion and government).
95. McConnell, supra note 22, at 1515.
96. See infra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., BRADLEY, supra note 53, at 9; Smith, supra note 16, at 97; Phillip E. John-
son, Concepts and Compromise in First Amendment Religious Doctrine, 72 CAL. L. REV. 817,
830 (1984).
98. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 263 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); see Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 400 (1983) (endorsing Powell's point).
99. See ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION: SOCIETY
AND FAITH SINCE WORLD WAR II 218-25 (1988).
100. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 386 (1975) (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Indeed, I see at least as much potential for divisive political debate in
opposition to the crabbed attitude the Court shows in this case."). This pacification strategy
only works if those in favor of public religion acquiesce. See Frederick M. Gedicks, The Reli-
gious, the Secular, and the Antithetical, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 113, 139 (1991).
101. See Johnson, supra note 97, at 830-31.
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be included in the AFLA program, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion relied
on the fact that a significant proportion of the federal funds would not be
distributed to "pervasively sectarian" organizations. Most of the Justices
seemed concerned about public money going to organizations with a strong
religious identity and the Justices seemed united in their opposition to hav-
ing religious doctrine taught in a publicly funded program.1"2
This position, which discourages religious institutions from maintaining
strong religious identities, needs to be resisted. This aspect of the current
doctrine fails to accord appropriate respect to both the value of religious
liberty and the important contributions of religious institutions. The basic
problem stems from the Court's understanding of the "primary effect" prong
of Lemon in direct funding cases. 13 In most of the parochial aid cases, the
102. The Court upheld the facial validity of AFLA and remanded to determine whether
the Act was unconstitutional as applied. The Court noted that a senate report on the Act had
stated the view that " 'the use of Adolescent Family Life Act funds to promote religion, or to
teach the religious doctrines of a particular sect, is contrary to the intent of this legislation.'"
See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 614-15 (quoting S. REP. No. 496, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1984)). The
majority admitted "that the record contains evidence of specific incidents of impermissible
behavior by AFLA grantees," id. at 620, and seemed to agree that it would violate the Estab-
lishment Clause if AFLA grantees used materials that had religious content or that were
designed to inculcate the views of a particular religious denomination. Id. at 621. Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion emphasized her view that "any use of public funds to promote
religious doctrines violates the Establishment Clause." Id. at 623 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which was joined by Justice Scalia, maintained that it would
be insufficient on remand for the plaintiffs to prove the AFLA grants were made to "perva-
sively sectarian" institutions. According to Justice Kennedy, "[tihe question in an as-applied
challenge is not whether the entity is of a religious character, but how it spends its grant." Id.
at 624-25 (Kennedy, J., concurring). He indicated that it would be unconstitutional if AFLA
"funds are in fact being used to further religion." Id. at 624.
103. Notably, the Court is considering abandoning Lemon. See supra note 32. The pro-
posals set forth in this Article do not require a complete rejection of all aspects of Lemon
doctrine. If the Court does abandon the Lemon test, its new approach would likely be far
more favorable to public funding of religious institutions. It now seems generally assumed that
some of the earlier cases, such as Aguilar, would be decided the other way because of the
recent changes in Court personnel. See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggre-
gated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1010 (1990) [hereinafter Laycock,
Neutrality Toward Religion]. There still are some changes needed, however. The conserva-
tives on the Court have generally voted against "direct" aid to parochial schools. See, e.g.,
Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 798 (1973) (Burger,
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (agreeing that a state grant to parochial schools
for maintenance and repair of facilities and equipment violated the establishment clause be-
cause it was a direct aid to religion.). But see Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty
v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (upholding direct reimbursement of parochial schools for the
cost of administering state-prepared standardized tests). Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Ny-
quist was joined by Justice Rehnquist on this issue. Justice Kennedy appears to hold the same
position. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that the government may not give direct benefits to
religion).
1991]
Catholic University Law Review
Court's error in regard to the primary effect prong has been to isolate the
portion of the government program that aids religion."o This focus is inap-
propriate in an era of pervasive government spending. 105 The more appro-
priate focus examines the government's overall role with respect to the
subject in question. It is wrong, for example, to focus on just the portion of
public funding that benefits a religious school; a broader focus on the public
funding of education generally is necessary. From this broader perspective,
it is difficult to imagine a situation where government funding would have
the "primary effect" of advancing religion. This simple shift in perspective
would allow the government to include religious institutions in various social
welfare programs. " Moreover, since the focus would be on the government
program as a whole, it would not be necessary for the religious institutions
receiving assistance to abandon their religious identities. Although it might
be preferable to abandon the Lemon test altogether, this change in under-
standing of the "primary effect" prong would greatly reduce the extent to
which the Establishment Clause doctrine promotes the privatization model.
The conservative Justices' apparent view on this issue cannot be traced to
the privatization thesis. Some of the conservative Justices-Justices Ken-
nedy and Scalia, in particular 1 0 7-may believe that the government should
not provide a direct subsidy to religion.'0 8 The history and tradition of the
Establishment Clause considerably supports the view that the clause prohib-
its direct financial support for churches. " This view is not necessarily
based upon hostility to a public role for religion. In fact, this view--opposi-
tion to compulsory taxation to support religion-significantly respects reli-
gious liberty." 0  Indeed, there is little reason to believe that the
104. See Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra note 32, at 106 n.217, 110 (emphasizing the need to
focus on the government's overall conduct). But see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 707 &
n. 12 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should isolate the portion of the
program that appears to violate the establishment clause).
105. See McConnell, supra note 39, at 1014-22; Michael W. McConnell, Unconstitutional
Conditions: Unrecognized Implications for the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
255, 263-271 (1989).
106. Under this view, it would not matter whether the religious institutions received the aid
directly or indirectly. Chief Justice Burger noted that the direct-indirect distinction was "pre-
mised more on experience and history than on logic." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 802 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). This Article supports the adoption of the more
logically consistent approach to these questions, which does not depend on the direct-indirect
distinction.
107. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 624 (1988) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
108. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); see also Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 42-43
(1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (indicating disapproval of direct subsidies).




conservatives' disapproval of direct subsidies results from adherence to the
privatization theory.
The conservative view is mistaken, however, at least in the context typi-
cally presented to the Court. The direct subsidy cases do not involve taxes
specifically earmarked for religious groups.11 Rather, when viewed from
the appropriate baseline, cases such as those involving educational funding
do not involve subsidies to religion at all.1" 2 The conservatives may be more
inclined to view government funding against the baseline of common law
entitlements. Therefore, the conservative Justices may be less concerned
about the impact of denials of government funding 1 3 than with the award of
government funds in situations where the Constitution plausibly prohibits
such assistance, such as in Establishment Clause cases. The explanation,
however mistaken, is not the result of adherence to the privatization theory.
Similarly, it would be a mistake to explain Justice O'Connor's view in
Bowen in terms of the privatization theory. Her opposition to direct public
funding of the teaching of religious doctrine more accurately results from
the same conservative view previously noted.1 4 More generally, her en-
dorsement theory does not seem to reflect a negative view of religion.'1 In
fact, Justice O'Connor has been quite willing to countenance substantial
public aid to religion." 6 Her votes against public support for religion are
11. See Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra note 32, at 109 n.227.
112. The conservatives have sometimes recognized this point. See Meek v. Pittenger, 421
U.S. 349, 386-87 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 389,
395 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 803 (1973) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 665 (1971) (White, J., dissenting).
There does not, however, seem to be any enthusiasm for the conclusion that the denial of aid is
a free exercise violation, as Witters v. Washington Dept. of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481
(1986), suggests. See supra note 67 (discussing Witters).
113. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1778 (1991) (" 'The financial constraints
that restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected
freedom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortion, but
rather of her indigency.'" (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 287, 316 (1980)); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). Another way to characterize
this conservative stance is to emphasize the conservatives' typical deference to the legislature.
See McConnell, supra note 39, at 1049. This may help to explain Witters.
114. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
115. For a thorough criticism of Justice O'Connor's approach, see Steven D. Smith, Sym-
bols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement"
Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 274 n.45 (1987) (citing extensive commentary on Justice
O'Connor's approach).
116. Justice O'Connor has supported substantial public aid to religion in cases such as
Bowen, Witters, Aguilar, and Mueller.
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better explained by her subjective perception of symbolic-as opposed to
real--offense.' 
17
This Article's position, which would allow direct funding of "pervasively
sectarian" institutions,"" is based on an appeal to genuine pluralism. Reli-
gious institutions have long played an important role in providing a range of
social welfare activities.' 1 9 Religious schools are the most notable example.
These religious institutions, along with the family, are the most important of
the "mediating structures"12 that serve a vital role in maintaining the
health and freedom of a society.
121
Because these institutions play such an essential role in our society, we
should be concerned about a legal doctrine that makes it difficult for them to
retain their distinctive identities. Bowen and the school funding cases illus-
trate this danger. These cases indicate that religious institutions can be in-
cluded in government programs only if they abandon their religious identity.
Consequently, as government expands its role in activities that have been the
responsibility of mediating institutions, such as child care, there is a risk of
losing the unique contributions of these institutions. To avoid this result, the
Court should abandon the approach adopted in Bowen and the school aid
cases.
Society should recognize the valuable, public role of these institutions.
The strong religious identity of a religious school or child care facility should
not disqualify the religious institution from participation in a government
funded program.122 We should, of course, maintain safeguards to ensure
that government funding does not influence religious choice.' 2 3 But assum-
117. Commentators have frequently noted the subjectivity of Justice O'Connor's approach.
See, e.g., William P. Marshall, "We Know It When We See It" The Supreme Court and Estab-
lishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 536 (1986).
118. The author does not consider whether the Constitution requires such funding.
119. See generally Thomas W. Pickrell & Mitchell A. Horwich, "Religion as an Engine of
Civil Policy". A Comment on the First Amendment Limitations on the Church-State Partnership
in the Social Welfare Field, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111 (1981).
120. P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING
STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLICY (1977); see also R. MCCARTHY ET AL., SOCIETY, STATE &
SCHOOLS: A CASE FOR STRUCTURAL AND CONFESSIONAL PLURALISM (1981).
121. See BERGER & NEUHAUS, supra note 120; see also John H. Garvey, Churches and the
Free Exercise of Religion, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 567, 587-88 (1990);
Frederick M. Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989
Wis. L. REV. 99, 115-16.
122. But see Habel v. Industrial Dev. Auth., 400 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1991) (holding that the
proposed bond issue violated the Establishment Clause because the educational institution in-
volved was pervasively sectarian). For a critique of Habel, see Al McConnell, Note, Abolish-
ing Separate but (Un)equal Status for Religious Universities, 77 VA. L. REV. 1231 (1991).
123. See Michael W. McConnell, Unconstitutional Conditions: Unrecognized Implications
for the Establishment Clause, 26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 255, 270 (1989) (suggesting that the
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ing that appropriate safeguards are in place, there should be no barrier to
including institutions with strong religious identities in government funded
programs. In fact, their inclusion should be encouraged so as to maintain
genuine pluralism without imposing financial disadvantages on religious
actors. 124
2. Religious Symbols
The privatization thesis is also influential when courts find that displaying
religious symbols on public property violates the Establishment Clause. The
courts advocate that government should be insulated from religious symbols
and practices so that it does not depart from "the constitutional command of
secular government."' 125 The major cases in this area are Lynch v. Don-
nelly.2 6 and County of Allegheny v. ACL U. 12 7 In Lynch, the Court held that
it did not violate the Establishment Clause for Pawtucket, Rhode Island, to
sponsor a Christmas display that included a Santa Claus house, a reindeer, a
clown, an elephant, a teddy bear, a talking wishing well, Christmas lights,
and a Nativity Scene. 2  In County of Allegheny, the Court considered the
constitutionality of two holiday displays on public property. The Court held
that it did violate the Establishment Clause to display a creche on the Grand
Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse, but that it did not violate the
clause to place a Jewish menorah just outside the City-County building next
to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty.
129
problem with AFLA was that there were only two grants per states; there was a need to
protect the beneficiaries from unwelcome religious indoctrination because the beneficiaries had
little choice about where to receive government funded services).
124. See Gedicks, supra note 12, at 445 (stating that in some circumstances government
should assist religious groups as part of a general program when their religious teachings are
consistent with the policy goals of the program). The child care regulations recently proposed
by the Department of Health and Human Services, see supra note 6 and accompanying text,
illustrate how the government should implement a social welfare program so as not to disad-
vantage religious institutions or individuals.
125. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 490, 611 (1989).
126. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
127. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), could also be character-
ized as a "religious symbol" case. In Stone, the Court relied on the absence of a secular legisla-
tive purpose in striking down a Kentucky statute requiring the posting of the Ten
Commandments in public school classrooms. Notably, Justice Rehnquist's stated in his dis-
sent that "[t]he Establishment Clause does not require that the public sector be insulated from
all things which may have a religious significance or origin." Id. 45-46 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
128. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 672-87 (1984). For a detailed discussion of Lynch, see Myers,
Nativity Scenes, supra note 32.
129. County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 621. Justice Blackmun wrote the Court's opinion on
the unconstitutionality of the creche display. This opinion was joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor were also in the majority
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The public role for religion involved in the religious symbol cases may
seem rather innocuous. These cases, however, provide a framework to ex-
amine different theoretical approaches to the Establishment Clause.' 30 The
importance of symbols in shaping public culture should not be
underestimated. 1
3 1
The religious symbol cases do not inevitably reflect the privatization the-
ory. There are a variety of approaches to the Establishment Clause that bar
the public display of religious symbols that do not seem to be influenced by
the privatization thesis. Some commentators who are quite supportive of a
public role for religion maintain that the Establishment Clause bars all pub-
lic displays of religious symbols. For example, Professor Laycock, a strong
proponent of religious liberty, 132 argues that the government itself cannot
aid religion at all and concludes therefore that the names of many cities,
such as Corpus Christi and Los Angeles, violate the Establishment
Clause.' 3   Moreover, the "no-preference" theory of the Establishment
Clause, which is clearly placed in the accommodationist camp,134 can be
interpreted to bar the public display of religious symbols because such dis-
plays, like the one in Lynch, are usually preferential. '5
in upholding the menorah display. On this result, they were joined by Justices Kennedy,
White, and Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist. For a discussion on the religious symbol issue,
see Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra note 32. The Supreme Court cases have caused a great deal
of confusion in the lower courts. See id. at 70-90 (discussing cases prior to County of Alle-
gheny); Doe v. Small, 934 F.2d 743, 753 (7th Cir.) (citing many of the post-County of Alle-
gheny cases), vacated, reh'g granted, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 25128 (7th Cir. 1991).
130. It is not a coincidence that the symbol cases have provided the first opportunity for
extended articulations of the theories that are currently contending for dominance on the
Court. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655-79 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (setting forth an approach to the Establishment Clause that places signifi-
cant reliance on "coercion"); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (setting
forth her endorsement theory).
131. See Marshall, supra note 117, at 550.
132. See Laycock, Neutrality Toward Religion, supra note 103; Laycock, Nonpreferential
Aid, supra note 34; Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status
of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Laycock,
Equal Access]; Laycock, Religious Liberty, supra note 30.
133. Laycok, Equal Access, supra note 132, at 8.
134. See Smith, supra note 32, at 981 n.136.
135. Laycock, Nonpreferential Aid, supra note 34, at 920. Although Justice O'Connor
votes to strike down certain displays, County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 623-37 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), she rejects the privatization thesis. Her endorsement theory is sometimes quite
supportive of "public" religion. She typically votes in favor of aid to religious institutions, see
supra note 116, and in favor of allowing religiously-influenced moral judgments to influence
legislation. See infra Section III. Justice O'Connor may be the most consistently "pro-reli-
gion" Justice. She parts company with the conservatives in free exercise cases, where she is
more supportive of free exercise claimants. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 724-33
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Yet, certain approaches to the religious symbol cases do reflect the priva-
tization theory. For example, Justice Blackmun opposes the public display
of religious symbols because the displays violate "the constitutional com-
mand of secular government."' 36 Again, this explanation reflects a desire to
screen religion from any direct influence on public life.
Under this theory, the determinative factor is whether a symbol is secular.
The only justification for the National Motto ("In God We Trust") is that it
has lost any religious content.' 37 This position inevitably results from the
view that "the Constitution mandates that the government remain secular,
rather than affiliat[ing] itself with religious beliefs or institutions, precisely to
avoid discriminating among citizens on the basis of their religious faiths."'
' 31
The key factor then is how to define secular. Justice Blackmun repeatedly
used the term "secular"'' 39 in a way that contrasts it with the concept "reli-
gious."'" His reading of the Establishment Clause apparently "require[s]
that the public sector be insulated from all things which may have a religious
significance or origin."''
(1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503, 528-33 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The symbol cases may reflect her theory's
shortcomings. Because her theory is highly subjective, it is difficult to apply consistently.
Some commentators who admire her approach think that she does not apply it correctly. See,
e.g., Arnold H. Loewy, Rethinking Government Neutrality Towards Religion Under the Estab-
lishment Clause: The Untapped Potential of Justice O'Connor's Insight, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1049,
1051 (1986).
136. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 611.
137. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Not everyone
agrees that the National Motto is constitutional. See Laycock, Equal Access, supra note 132, at
8; Loewy, supra note 135, at 1059.
138. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 610 (emphasis added).
139. Justice Blackmun used the term "secular" 55 times in his opinion in County of
Allegheny.
140. Professor Smith notes that the concept of the "secular" is used in two different senses
in the cases. He describes these as exclusionary and inclusionary. According to the exclusion-
ary conception, which is the way Justice Blackmun used the word in County of Allegheny,
secular is understood "by what [it] shuts out-beliefs and values that are religious in nature."
Smith, supra note 32, at 1000. According to the inclusionary conception of secular, which was
used by the majority in Lynch, secular is understood "through what it encompasses ....
Secular beliefs, values, practices, or facts are those that pertain to the affairs of this world or
this life; they stand in contrast to beliefs, values, practices or facts that pertain to other worlds,
other lives, or other dimensions of reality." Id.
141. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 45-46 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). "[R]igorous
implementation of [this view of "secular"] might so shrink the category of permissible secular
measures that virtually every law and public program would be vulnerable to an establishment
clause challenge." Smith, supra note 32, at 1003. Although he did not deny that the menorah
had religious significance, Justice Blackmun interpreted the display as basically secular in
character. "[T]he city's overall display must be understood as conveying the city's secular
recognition of different traditions for celebrating the winter-holiday season." County of Alle-
gheny, 492 U.S. at 620. No other Justice agreed with Justice Blackmun's conclusion about the
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Perhaps the "secular government" explanation overstates the conse-
quences of Justice Blackmun's position. Granted, he did disavow any hostil-
ity or indifference to religion. 142 His view is, however, hostile to any
"public" manifestation of religion.' 43 Whenever the command of secular
government clashes with a claim of religious liberty, secularism prevails.
The public forum cases are a good illustration.'" For example, in Kaplan
v. City of Burlington,14 5 the Second Circuit held that the display of a meno-
rah in Burlington's City Hall Park violated the Establishment Clause, even
though the park was a public forum.' 46 As the Kaplan dissent concluded,
"the denial of permission to display the menorah would constitute unneces-
sary hostility toward religion.... [D]enying access to the traditional public
forum ... would treat religious expression differently from other forms of
protected expression . . . . "'47 Excluding religion from the public sector,
secular character of the menorah display. See id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 643-
44 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 676-77 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
142. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 611-12.
143. Apparently, the only exception arises in narrow situations where it is clear that there
is no risk that anyone might construe that the government was endorsing religion. See id. at
612 (citing the example of a religious group going caroling through a city park during Advent).
This exception is quite narrow, because Justice Blackmun appears to reject the argument that
religious speakers have equal access to public forums. See infra note 144. Justice Blackmun is
not hostile to religion, as his view on the free exercise clause indicates. See infra Section II.B.
He only favors a private role for religion.
144. As the Court noted, County of Allegheny did not raise a "public forum" issue. Id. at
600 n.50. Yet, it appears that "the command of secular government" analysis prohibits even
the display of a religious symbol in a public forum. Some lower court opinions have inter-
preted County of Allegheny the same way, and that conclusion seems to accurately reflect
Justice Blackmun's view. In McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1984), aff'd, 171 U.S.
83 (1985), the Second Circuit concluded that the Village of Scarsdale could not rely on the
establishment clause to deny two private groups access to a public forum to display a Nativity
scene. The Supreme Court affirmed by an equally divided Court. Board of Trustees v. Mc-
Creary, 471 U.S. 83 (1985). Justice Powell, who was with the 5-4 majority in Lynch, did not
participate in McCreary. Thus, it appears that Justice Blackmun voted to reverse the Second
Circuit's conclusion on the public forum issue.
145. 891 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2619 (1990). For cases agreeing
with Kaplan on the public forum issue, see Smith v. County of Albemarle, 895 F.2d 953 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 74 (1990); Doe v. Small, 934 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.), vacated, reh'g
granted, 947 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1991).
146. Kaplan, 891 F.2d at 1028-29.
147. Id. at 1034 (Meskill, J., dissenting). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has indicated that it agrees with the dissent in Kaplan. See Congregation Lubavitch v.
City of Cincinnati, 923 F.2d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 1991), appeal dismissed, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS
25128 (7th Cir. 1991); Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand
Rapids, 922 F.2d 303, 309-10 (6th Cir. 1990); ACLU v. Wilkinson, 895 F.2d 1098, 1102 (6th
Cir. 1990); see also Doe v. Small, 934 F.2d 743, 809 (7th Cir. 1991) (Coffey, J., dissenting)




even when religious actors are denied rights of access freely available to the
nonreligious, indicates that the secular government model owes a great deal
to the privatization thesis.'48
An alternative approach to the religious symbol cases explicitly rejects
the privatization thesis. Some Justices have been far more receptive to the
public display of religious symbols, in part because they reject an interpreta-
tion of the Establishment Clause that supports the view that religion must be
screened from public life. These Justices are concerned about sending a
broader message that the government must be insulated from all things reli-
gious.149 For example, Justice Kennedy's dissent in County ofAllegheny re-
jects the "relentless extirpation of all contact between government and
religion."15 His view is far more sympathetic to a public role for religion.
As Justice Kennedy stated, "the Establishment Clause permits government
some latitude in recognizing and accommodating the central role religion
plays in our society." ' Justice Kennedy's view rejects the "secular govern-
ment" perspective, at least when secular is interpreted in a way that prohib-
its significant contacts between religion and the public sector.1 52 Justice
Kennedy's view' comports with Justice Goldberg's position in Abington
Township v. Schempp:
154
It is said, and I agree, that the attitude of government toward reli-
gion must be one of neutrality. But untutored devotion to the con-
cept of neutrality can lead to invocation or approval of results
which partake not simply of that noninterference and noninvolve-
ment with the religious which the Constitution commands, but of a
brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular and a passive, or
even active, hostility to the religious. Such results are not only not
compelled by the Constitution, but, it seems to me, are prohibited
by it.
Neither government nor this Court can or should ignore the sig-
nificance of the fact that a vast portion of our people believe in and
worship God and that many of our legal, political and personal
148. In light of the liberal Justices' views on other issues involving a public role for religion,
such as funding and substantive due process cases, the secular government explanation should
not be viewed as simply a rhetorical flourish. The explanation does accurately capture the
liberals' stance vis-d-vis public religion.
149. See Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra note 32, at 113-15.
150. 492 U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
151. Id. see also Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672-78 (1984).
152. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 677-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
153. See id. at 659.
154. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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values derive historically from religious teachings. Government
must inevitably take cognizance of the existence of religion. ...
Justice Kennedy makes the important point that the "secular govern-
ment" model that the majority finds embodied in the Establishment Clause
is a model that would not have occurred to those responsible for the First
Amendment.156 As Professor Smith has stated in describing the world of
eighteenth century Americans:
Religious premises, assumptions, and values provided the general
framework within which most Americans thought about and dis-
cussed important philosophical, moral, and political issues. For
that reason, Americans of the time could not seriously contemplate
a thoroughly secular political culture from which religious beliefs,
motives, purposes, rhetoric, and practices would be filtered out. 57
Justice Kennedy appeals to that heritage, which rejects any rigid separa-
tion of religion and public life.' 58 Under that approach, the public display of
religious symbols might serve important functions. First, "public displays of
religious symbols might be viewed as affirmations of the important role reli-
gion and religiously-based principles play in preserving the American experi-
ment."' 59 Second, the public display of religious symbols recognizes that
there is an authority beyond that of the state." ° In this regard, allowing
religious symbols on public property is an act of humility, rather than the
155. Id. at 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
156. See County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
157. Smith, supra note 32, at 966; see also M.E. Bradford, Religion and the Framers: The
Biographical Evidence, 4 BENCHMARK 349 (1990).
158. See also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952).
We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being. We guar-
antee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We make room for as wide a variety of
beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an
attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that
lets each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.
When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authori-
ties by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of
our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommo-
dates the public service to their spiritual needs.
Id.
159. Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra note 32, at 114.
160. Id.; see Peter L. Berger, The First Freedom, COMMENTARY, Dec. 1988, at 64, 65.
Berger states:
But the most important 'secular purpose' any church can serve is to remind people
that there is a meaning to human existence that transcends all worldly agendas, that
all human institutions (including the nation-state) are only relatively important, and
that all worldly authority-even that of the Supreme Court of the United States-is
disclosed as comically irrelevant in the perspective of transcendence.
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aggressive threat of religious persecution that is commonly attributed to
such government action.'
61
Nevertheless, despite the important functions religious symbols serve, the
government should not require the posting of those symbols on public prop-
erty. It would be entirely appropriate for a community to decide voluntarily
not to display symbols that are likely to cause offense. 162 Nonetheless, the
Constitution should not be interpreted to require the exclusion of all reli-
gious symbols from public property to enforce a perceived constitutional
command of secular government.
63
Some Justices argue that the public display of religious symbols leads to
political divisiveness along religious lines, which is an independent ground
for finding an Establishment Clause violation.'" For three reasons that ar-
gument is unconvincing. First, the "divisiveness" rationale has little histori-
cal support.165 Second, as a doctrinal matter, there is little if any vitality to
the divisiveness theory.1 66 Third, and perhaps most important, political di-
visiveness rhetoric is just that-rhetoric. The Court's appeal to "divisive-
161. Cf. McConnell, supra note 22, at 1516. McConnell states:
[T]he free exercise clause also makes an important statement about the limited nature
of governmental authority. While the government is powerless and incompetent to
determine what particular conception of the divine is authoritative, the free exercise
clause stands as a recognition that such divine authority may exist and, if it exists,
has a rightful claim on the allegiance of believers who happen to be American citi-
zens. The actual occasions for free exercise exemptions may be rare now, as in our
early history; but the importance of the principle outstrips its practical consequences.
If government admits that God (whomever that may be) is sovereign, then it also
admits that its claims on the loyalty and obedience of the citizens is partial and in-
strumental. Even the mighty democratic will of the people is, in principle,
subordinate to the commands of God, as heard and understood in the individual
conscience. In such a nation, with such a commitment, totalitarian tyranny is a phil-
osophical impossibility.
Iai
162. See Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra note 32, at 111-12. Outside the public forum con-
text (where the Constitution requires equal access), the display of a religious symbol on public
property would be a political question. Id. at 110 & n.234 (noting that there would, of course,
still be constraints on the government's exercise of discretion; the government could not exer-
cise its discretion in a discriminatory manner). That is how the courts normally handle the
display of offensive symbols. See NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1990). See gener-
ally Marshall, supra note 46.
163. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 611.
164. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 702-704 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (dis-
cussing this argument); County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 651 (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part), The majority in Lynch rejected the divisiveness argument. 465 U.S. at
684-85.
165. See supra note 54.
166. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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ness" is entirely derivative of the Court's underlying theory of the
Establishment Clause.
The religious symbol cases are illustrative of this point. Regardless of how
the issue is decided, it leads to division along religious lines.'" 7 Allowing the
display of the symbols of the faith of the majority may offend members of
minority religions. Excluding displays with a high religious content may
also offend minority faiths because their symbols, such as menorahs, may be
excluded while the symbols of the religious majority that a court perceives as
secular, such as Christmas trees, 168 will be allowed. 169 Finally, excluding all
religious symbols may offend those who would like to display their religious
symbols. Any solution is likely to lead to divisiveness; the different options
simply shift the locus of the opposition.
Perhaps the last form of resentment should be irrelevant because it merely
expresses disagreement with the Establishment Clause itself.'70 This re-
sponse is entirely derivative of the particular view of the Establishment
Clause being advanced. The resentment of those who would like to see a
creche displayed on the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County Court-
house only can be discounted if we have already decided that the Establish-
ment Clause prohibits such displays. That conclusion about the proper
reading of the Establishment Clause may be correct, but the conclusion in no
way depends on measuring whether government action has led to political
division along religious lines. The conclusion rests on the underlying theory
of the Establishment Clause that determines which forms of offense are con-
stitutionally legitimate. The secular government model does not, therefore,
gain any additional strength from its appeal to the divisiveness caused by the
interaction between religion and government.'
7 1
167. Supreme Court decisions may make things worse. See Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra
note 32, at 107 n.219.
168. As Judge Posner has pointed out, the Christmas tree does have religious connotations.
ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265, 271 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 961
(1986).
169. See Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra note 32, at 110 n.234; see also Lubavitch Chabad
House, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 917 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that Chicago could
refuse to allow erection of menorah at O'Hare Airport even though city sponsored a display
that contained Christmas trees).
170. See County ofAllegheny, 492 U.S. at 611.
To be sure, in a pluralistic society there may be some would-be theocrats, who wish
that their religion were an established creed, and some of them perhaps may be even
audacious enough to claim that the lack of established religion discriminates against
their preferences. But this claim gets no relief, for it contradicts the fundamental
premise of the Establishment Clause itself.
Id.
171. The divisiveness caused by enforcing constitutional rights is not itself a reason for
judicial restraint. See Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra note 32, at 107 n.219. Hence government
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As already noted, the religious symbol cases are difficult because they flesh
out the different theoretical approaches to the Establishment Clause. 7 '
While the privatization thesis has had some influence in this area, the influ-
ence is unwarranted. The possibility that there is something inherently sus-
pect about the government "affiliat[ing] itself with religious beliefs or
institutions" should be denied.173 Granted this affiliation may be trouble-
some; indeed, certain contacts between government and religion may result
in threats to religious liberty.174 Such threats, however, do not inevitably
arise from the connection between government and religion, as the privatiza-
tion thesis suggests.
In some situations involving religious symbols, the privatization thesis se-
verely disadvantages religion. The public forum cases illustrate how the the-
sis can threaten religious liberty. Rigorous pursuit of the "command of
secular government" would exclude religious groups from equal access to a
public forum. That conclusion suggests that there is something wrong with
the theory. However the religious symbol cases are decided, the privatiza-
tion thesis (or as it is manifested in this context, the "constitutional com-
mand of secular government""' 7) should not have a role.
176
3. Purpose
The privatization thesis is also reflected in cases where the Court invali-
dated statutes because they failed the first prong of the Lemon test, the secu-
lar purpose requirement. 177 According to this test, an otherwise valid law is
struck down if it is enacted for the purpose of advancing religion.' 7 8 In
action that causes divisiveness is not itself a reason for finding the action unconstitutional. An
independent justification addressing what kinds of divisiveness that should to be tolerated is
needed.
172. See supra notes 132-65 and accompanying text.
173. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 610.
174. The school prayer cases are an example. See Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra note 32, at
108 n.225. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 1305
(1991), does not exemplify this proposition.
175. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 611.
176. See Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra note 32 (discussing the author's views on the reli-
gious symbol issue).
177. See supra note 32 (explaining the Lemon test).
178. Focusing purely on motivation is peculiar to this particular area of constitutional law.
See McConnell, supra note 57, at 47-48; Hal Culbertson, Note, Religion in the Political Pro-
cess: A Critique of Lemon's Purpose Test, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 915, 917. Although the Court
uses a "purpose" analysis in other areas of constitutional law, see Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229 (1976), the Court's use of illicit purpose alone, without regard to effect, is unique.
For example, "[i]n equal protection cases, there is no inquiry into 'intent' unless there are
disparate results; the function of legislative motivation is to determine whether discriminatory
effects are unconstitutional." McConnell, supra note 57, at 47 (footnote omitted). This author
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certain cases, Wallace v. Jaffree 179 and Edwards v. Aguillard '80 in particu-
lar, the Court suggested that the involvement of religious groups in the polit-
ical process was objectionable. The Court's reliance on the religious
statements and motives of the supporters of the legislation being challenged
strongly suggested that religion should be confined to a purely private
realm. 181
If the Court aggressively used the secular purpose requirement, it would
be a powerful instrument for promoting the privatization thesis. Some com-
mentators have, in fact, cited the Court's secular purpose cases to support
the theory that Establishment Clause doctrine promotes a privatized religion
and secularized politics. 
1 82
While the secular purpose cases are potentially troublesome, it would be a
mistake to read too much into them. These cases do not establish a durable
body of precedent that works to restrict the political participation of reli-
gious groups. I 3  Further, the Court's more recent decisions on the issue
has argued that the Lemon test ought to be abandoned, see Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra note
32, at 97-106, and it appears that the Lemon test has a limited life-span. See supra note 32.
Even if it retains the Lemon test, the Court should change its "purpose" analysis.
179. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). In Wallace, the Court held that an Alabama statute that author-
ized a one minute period of silence in public schools "for meditation or voluntary prayer," id.
at 40, violated the Establishment Clause. The Court relied exclusively on the absence of a
secular purpose. Relying heavily on a statement by the legislation's sponsor, the Court con-
cluded that the statute was designed simply to return voluntary prayer to the public schools.
180. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). In Edwards, the Court held that the Louisiana Balanced Treat-
ment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School Instruction Act, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17:286.1-17:286.7 (West 1982), violated the Establishment Clause. The Court
relied exclusively on the purpose prong of Lemon. Taking into account statements by the
legislation's sponsor, the Court concluded that "[t]he preeminent purpose of the Louisiana
Legislature was clearly to advance the religious viewpoint that a supernatural being created
humankind." 482 U.S. at 591.
181. This message also draws on the same concern about religious strife and religious dom-
ination that influenced the Framers. See McConnell, supra note 57, at 14-15. Yet, the Fram-
ers did not seek to deal with these concerns by screening religion from public life. See supra
notes 94-95 and accompanying text. Further, our political history is full of religious activism
in public life. See infra notes 216-19 and accompanying text.
182. Bradley, Dogmatomachy, supra note 15, at 315-16; Gedicks, supra note 12, at 426
n.27; Gedicks, supra note 100, at 138 n.94; Smith, supra note 32, at 993-99; Mark Tushnet, The
Constitution of Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 725 (1986).
183. One difficulty with the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test is that it is difficult to
articulate precisely what the requirement means. As Justice Rehnquist noted in Wallace, "The
secular purpose prong has proven mercurial in application because it has never been fully
defined, and we have never fully stated how the test is to operate." 472 U.S. at 108 (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). See TRIBE, supra note 53, at 1209 ("As applied in establishment clause litiga-
tion, the secular purpose test remains only hazily defined."). The situation certainly has not
changed since Wallace. The Court never has been entirely clear about such questions as the
meaning of "secular." See Smith, supra note 32, at 999-1007. It is not clear whether the Court
looks to the purpose of the statute or the motivations of the sponsors or supporters of the
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seem to have put to rest the troubling implications of the language in earlier
cases. 
184
The Supreme Court has relied on the secular purpose requirement in only
four cases: Epperson v. Arkansas,"8 5 Stone v. Graham,'"6 Wallace v. Jaf-
free, 8 7 and Edwards v. Aguillard.'8 8 These cases share several features.
First, their reliance on the secular "purpose" requirement itself is a bit of an
oddity because, as Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in Edwards, "[a]lmost
invariably, we have effortlessly discovered a secular purpose for measures
challenged under the Establishment Clause, typically devoting no more than
a sentence or two to the matter."' 9 Second, the decisions all can be ex-
plained on other grounds.
legislation. See Laycock, Equal Access, supra note 132, at 23-24. It remains ambiguous about
"how much secular purpose is required," Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 782 (9th Cir.
1991) (Nelson, J., dissenting), and how to determine what the relevant "purpose" actually is.
See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 636-39 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because of these uncertainties, the
doctrine tends to be applied unpredictably, and, as the subsequent discussion will illustrate,
unnecessarily. The unpredictability can best be illustrated by comparing the four cases in
which the Court found a violation of the secular purpose requirement, see text at notes 185-88,
with cases such as Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), where the Court found that there
was a secular purpose for Pawtucket's display of a creche. Id. at 681. See Smith, supra note
32, at 1001-03 (discussing Lynch).
184. See eg., Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990).
185. 393 U.S. 97 (1968). In Epperson, the Court held unconstitutional Arkansas' anti-
evolution law, which prohibited the teaching in public schools of the theory that man evolved
from a lower order of animals. The Court explained that the law "was a product of the up-
surge of 'fundamentalist' religious fervor of the twenties." 393 U.S. at 98. Epperson obviously
did not rely on the first prong of the Lemon test, since Epperson was a pre-Lemon case. Epper-
son does rest on the Court's conclusion that an illicit motive was the basis for Arkansas' anti-
evolution law.
186. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
187. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
188. 482 U.S. 578 (1987). The school prayer cases did not rely exclusively on the lack of a
secular purpose. In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962), the indirect coercion involved
was an important aspect of the decision. In School Dist. of Abington Township. v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203 (1963), where the Court explicitly articulated the secular purpose requirement,
the Court seemed strongly influenced by the substance of the government action being chal-
lenged, namely, introducing religious exercises into the public schools. Engel, 374 U.S. at 222.
The Court's holding did not rest on the lack of a secular purpose. See Culbertson, supra note
178, at 928-29 (discussing Schempp).
189. 482 U.S. at 613 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Court tends to rely on "purpose" when
effect is problematic. There is no real injury in these cases, only offense. Yet, the Court has
the visceral (and incorrect) reaction that something is wrong. If we abandoned Lemon and the
notion that coercion was not a necessary part of an Establishment Clause case, see Michael W.
McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933
(1986); Myers, Nativity Scenes, supra note 32, at 101, we could get rid of focus on "purpose" as
an independent test of unconstitutionality.
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Epperson and Edwards are somewhat atypical because the subject matter
involved---evolution-provokes extreme reactions on all sides.' 90 The cases
illustrate the principle that seemingly easy cases make bad law.191 Justice
Scalia's assessment of the majority opinion in Edwards also applies to Epper-
son. Justice Scalia stated that the Court's opinion reflected "an intellectual
predisposition created by the facts and legend of Scopes v. State-an instinc-
tive reaction that any governmentally imposed requirements bearing upon
the teaching of evolution must be a manifestation of Christian fundamental-
ist repression.' 192 In striking down Arkansas' anti-evolution law, the Epper-
son Court relied on what it viewed as an unconstitutional motive. In
particular, the Court stated that the teaching of evolution had been pro-
scribed "because it is contrary to the belief of some that the Book of Genesis
must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man."19 Yet the
Court could have reached the same result without reference to the motiva-
tions of the law's supporters. The principal evil of the Arkansas statute
seemed to be that the state was tailoring the curriculum to the beliefs of a
particular religious perspective. 94 According to the Court, however, the
statute was tainted regardless of the motivations of the law's supporters.
195
Edwards can be explained in a similar fashion. The Court found an un-
constitutional purpose in a Louisiana statute forbidding the teaching of
evolution in public elementary and secondary schools unless balanced by
instruction in the theory of creation-science. 196 Yet, the case also can be
explained on other grounds. According to the Court's reading of the Louisi-
190. See generally PHILIP E. JOHNSON, DARWIN ON TRIAL (1991).
191. Cf Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2126 n.* (1990) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in the judgment) ("Perhaps the adage about hard cases making bad law should be revised
to cover easy cases.").
192. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
193. 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968) (emphasis added).
194. See id. at 106 (stating that "the First Amendment does not permit the State to require
that teaching and learning must be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious
sect or dogma").
195. See John H. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philoso-
phy of the Constitution, 72 CAL. L. REV. 847, 892 (1984).
The holding (of Epperson] could be simply that the anti-evolution statute was incapa-
ble of justification on any ground other than the beliefs of a particular religion. No
justification could be found under the constitutional philosophy for prohibiting the
teaching of evolution while permitting the teaching of other theories of human
origins.
Id.; see also Laycock, Equal Access, supra note 132, at 23 n. 114 ("But the Court also viewed
the statute as nonneutral in its effects, because the statute forbade only the teaching of
evolution.")
196. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594 ("But because the primary purpose of the Creationism




ana statute, the state was attempting to introduce the teaching of religious
doctrine into the public schools. 97 That would violate the Establishment
Clause without regard to the motives of the Act's supporters.
Stone, which held unconstitutional a Kentucky statute requiring that a
copy of the Ten Commandments be posted on the wall of each public class-
room in the state, 198 can also be explained by factors other than the presence
of an unconstitutional purpose. The Court did conclude that "[tihe pre-emi-
nent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls is
plainly religious in nature."' 99 Yet, as Justice Rehnquist's dissent main-
tained, the Kentucky legislature had articulated a secular purpose, which the
Kentucky trial court accepted. 200 Apparently, the key factor in the Court's
per curiam decision was that "[t]he Ten Commandments are undeniably a
sacred text."2 0 ' The Court could have reached the conclusion that injecting
religious texts into the classroom in the manner required by the Kentucky
statute was unconstitutional without regard to the purpose of the statute.
20 2
Even Wallace can be explained without reference to the religious motiva-
tions for the law. In Wallace, the Court held unconstitutional an Alabama
statute authorizing a moment of silence in all public schools for "meditation
197. The Louisiana Act only required the teaching of the scientific evidence for creation.
See id. at 581. Nevertheless, the Court interpreted "creation science" as "embod[ying] the
religious belief that a supernatural creator was responsible for the creation of humankind." Id
at 592; see also id. at 596 ("The Louisiana Creationism Act advances a religious doctrine by
requiring either the banishment of the theory of evolution from public school classrooms or the
presentation of a religious viewpoint that rejects evolution in its entirety."). Justice Scalia
objected to the majority's conclusion that the state was trying to introduce religious doctrine
into the public schools. See id. at 629 (Scalia, J., dissenting). He noted that the Act simply
required that scientific evidence against evolution be presented. Justice Scalia then
commented:
Perhaps what the Louisiana Legislature has done is unconstitutional because there is
no such evidence, and the scheme they have established will amount to no more than
a presentation of the Book of Genesis. But we cannot say that on the evidence before
us in this summary judgment context, which includes ample uncontradicted testi-
mony that "creation science" is a body of scientific knowledge rather than revealed
belief.
Id. at 634.
198. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 45-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
201. Id. at 41 (majority opinion).
202. Mansfield, supra note 195, at 892.
An adequate explanation of the result reached [in Stone] can be found in the fact
that, in view of the contents of the Ten Commandments, the circumstances under
which they were to be displayed and those to whom they were to be displayed, the
effect of posting them, and therefore the statute's only justification, would be the
promotion of a particular religion.
Id. The Court expressed concern about the effect of the posting. Stone, 449 U.S. at 42.
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or voluntary prayer." 20 3 While the Court relied on what it characterized as
the illicit motives of the legislation's sponsor,2°1 the Court also noted "[t]he
wholly religious character"2"5 of the Alabama statute.2°  Professor Laycock
has contended that this statute "openly favored religion" and that its reli-
gious purpose was shown on its face.20 7
In its latest foray into the secular purpose question, the Court adopted a
narrow view of the purpose prong. In Board of Education v. Mergens,208 the
Court upheld the Equal Access Act,2°9 which prohibits public secondary
schools that maintain a "limited open forum" from discriminating against
students who wish to use such a forum for a meeting on the basis of the
"religious, political, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such
meetings., 211 Prior to Mergens, some commentators, relying on the text,
legislative history, and the "strong support of equal access legislation among
evangelical religious groups,' '2  argued that the Equal Access Act failed to
satisfy the secular purpose requirement.21 2 Yet, the Court effortlessly dis-
covered a secular purpose. Disdaining the methodology used in Wallace and
Edwards, the Court avoided a detailed inquiry into the religious affiliation
and motives of the supporters of the Equal Access Act. Instead, the Court
simply inquired into the statute's purpose by focusing exclusively on the text
203. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59-60 (1985).
204. Id. at 56-60.
205. Id. at 58.
206. Id. at 58-59. An earlier statute already authorized a moment of silence for meditation;
the version the Supreme Court considered added the words "or voluntary prayer."
207. Laycock, EqualAccess, supra note 132, at 23 ("The Court could have invalidated [the
Alabama statute] for lack of a secular purpose, or it could have dispensed with the purpose test
and invalidated [the statute] for lack of neutrality.").
208. 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990). Although Justice O'Connor's opinion in Mergens on the secu-
lar purpose issue was not for a majority, the understanding of secular purpose expressed there
is significant. Id. at 2370-71. Two of the Justices who did not join that portion of her opinion
(Justices Kennedy and Scalia) are not favorably disposed to the secular purpose requirement.
Id. at 2376. Justice Kennedy is on record advocating that the requirement be abandoned and
the requirement is not a part of his approach to the Establishment Clause. See Mergens, 110 S.
Ct. at 2376-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Therefore, if
a statute satisfies Justice O'Connor's view of the secular purpose requirement expressed in
Mergens, which was joined by three other Justices, then the statute will not be held unconstitu-
tional on purpose grounds.
209. 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (1988).
210. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a)-(b).
211. Ruth G. Teitel, The Unconstitutionality of Equal Access Policies and Legislation Al-
lowing Organized Student-Initiated Religious Activities in the Public High Schools: A Proposal
for a Unitary First Amendment Forum Analysis, 12 HAST. CONST. L. Q. 529, 557 (1985).
212. Id. at 556-59; see also Robert G. Boisvert, Jr., OfEqual Access and Trojan Horses, 3
LAW & INEQ. J. 373, 387 (1985). Professor Bradley also noted that the Equal Access Act
would be susceptible to an Establishment Clause challenge under the approach used in Wal-
lace. See Bradley, Dogmatomachy, supra note 15, at 315-16.
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of the Act.2 13 Because the Act was neutral on its face-the Act protected
secular and religious speech-the Court found no illicit purpose.214
Thus, the secular purpose requirement serves no real function, especially
if the Court adopts its usual approach of construing "secular" in broad
terms. Apparently, the Court realized that aggressive use of the secular pur-
pose requirement would exclude religious citizens from the political pro-
cess. 2 1' Religious groups and individuals participate actively in debates on
civil rights legislation, sanctions against South Africa, aid to Israel, the mini-
mum wage, nuclear arms, welfare, agricultural policy, as well as other legis-
lative issues.216 Pope John Paul II's recent encyclical, Centesimus Annus,217
presents Roman Catholic teachings on a whole range of issues, from the
"family wage" and social insurance for old age and unemployment to the
rights of unions. The encyclical urged the local churches (including the Ro-
man Catholic Church in America) to advance these teachings in their own
countries. It would be inconceivable to hold that any legislation that re-
sulted from religious activism on any of these topics was unconstitutional
simply because of the religious motivations of those involved in the legisla-
tive process. 21 s As Justice Scalia noted,
[P]olitical activism by the religiously motivated is part of our heri-
tage .... [W]e do not presume that the sole purpose of a law is to
advance religion merely because it was supported strongly by or-
213. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2371; see also Culbertson, supra note 178, at 932-33.
214. Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2371.
215. Laycock, Equal Access, supra note 132, at 23-24; see Clayton v. Place, 884 F.2d 376
(8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990). In Clayton, the Eighth Circuit rejected an
Establishment Clause challenge to a public school district's policy prohibiting dances in the
public schools, although the court acknowledged that many residents and public officials op-
posed dancing on religious grounds. The court stated:
We simply do not believe elected government officials are required to check at the
door whatever religious backgrounds (or lack of it) they carry with them before they
act on the controlling Lemon standards. In addition to its unrealistic nature, this
approach would have the effect of disenfranchising religious groups when they suc-
ceed in influencing secular decision.
Id at 380.
216. See generally ALLEN D. HERTZKE, REPRESENTING GOD IN WASHINGTON: THE
ROLE OF RELIGIOUS LonBEs IN THE AMERICAN POLrTY (1988); A. JAMES REICHLEY, RELI-
GION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1985); Edward M. Gaffney, Jr., On Not Rendering to Cae-
sar: The Unconstitutionality of Tax Regulation of Activities of Religious Organizations Relating
to Politics, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1990).
217. 21 ORIGINS 1 (1991).
218. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 615 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). See generally Frederick M. Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and
Values: Some Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579
(1987); William C. Porth & Robert P. George, Trimming the Ivy: A Bicentennial Re-examina-
tion of the Establishment Clause, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 109, 130 (1987).
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ganized religions or by adherents of particular faiths. To do so
would deprive religious men and women of their right to partici-
pate in the political process. Today's religious activism may give
us the Balanced Treatment Act, but yesterday's resulted in the ab-
olition of slavery, and tomorrow's may bring relief for famine
victims.
219
The cases in which the Court has relied on the absence of a secular purpose
differ from the examples noted above because of the Court's perception of
the subject matter of the legislation. If it views the legislation as inherently
religious, such as requiring the teachings of creationism, posting of the Ten
Commandments, or prayer in the public schools, then the Court will occa-
sionally invoke the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test.220 The Court's
principal concern in these contexts is not religious motivations, as such, but
the character of the legislation.
Aggressive application of the secular purpose requirement would promote
the privatization thesis by greatly limiting religious groups' ability to partici-
pate in the political process. The Court's most recent decisions, Bowen v.
Kendrick22 ' and Mergens, are sensitive to this concern. Apparently, the
Court is moving toward the view that it should "assess the constitutionality
of the statute, not the religious beliefs of its supporters." '222 The Court ought
to make this view explicit.223
The privatization thesis has played a significant role in influencing Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine. Although some contend that the privatization
thesis dominates Establishment Clause jurisprudence, close analysis indi-
cates that that assessment is only partially true. Several Justices are quite
receptive to a public role for religion and the most recent Establishment
Clause cases illustrate the declining influence of the privatization thesis. For
the most part, the Establishment Clause doctrine has shifted toward the view
that religion has a valuable role to play in the public realm.
219. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 615 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citations omitted). See generally
Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 218; Porth & George, supra note 218, at 130.
220. See Esbeck, supra note 53, at 531-43.
221. 487 U.S. 589 (1988). While discussing the secular purpose requirement, the Court
focused principally on the text of the statute and adopted a deferential approach typical of
most discussions of the first prong of the Lemon test. Id. at 602-03.
222. Laycock, Equal Access, supra note 132, at 23.
223. "Purpose" should be used in a more conventional way. See McConnell, supra note
57, at 47-48. The formal existence of the first prong of Lemon is troublesome, especially given
the broad language of certain opinions. The preceding discussion illustrates, however, that the
secular purpose cases should not be overread. The results of the cases and the more recent
rulings are not as dangerous as some suggest.
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B. The Free Exercise Clause
The privatization thesis is not hostile to religion. Instead, the thesis is
hostile to a particular type of religion-public religion. Most of the Justices
who support the privatization thesis do not invariably vote against religious
entities or individuals. In fact, the liberal Justices, with the exception of
Justice Stevens, have been the strongest supporters on the Court for a more
generous construction of the Free Exercise Clause.224 Yet, the liberals' pro-
religion votes in free exercise cases also reflect the influence of the privatiza-
tion thesis.
The Court's most recent free exercise case, Employment Division, Depart-
ment of Human Resources v. Smith,225 is illustrative. In Smith, the Court
rewrote free exercise jurisprudence by eliminating constitutionally compelled
exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause.226 Smith involved two individu-
als who were denied unemployment compensation because of work-related
misconduct. The workers were fired from their jobs with a drug rehabilita-
tion organization due to their use of peyote, an illegal drug, even though
they used peyote for religious purposes. The Court concluded that Oregon
could "include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general
criminal prohibitions on use of that drug. '227 To allow an exemption from
laws prohibiting "socially harmful conduct '' 2 s would allow an individual
with a religious objection to such laws "to become a law unto himself., 229
The majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, reflects the same solicitude
224. E.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)
(Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
225. Id. For a thorough discussion of Smith, see Kathleen P. Kelly, Note, Abandoning
Free Exercise Exemptions: Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 40 CATH.
U. L. REV. 929 (1991).
226. Smith has been quite controversial. See Gordon, supra note 23; Laycock, supra note
23; McConnell, supra note 23. At least one commentator supports the result, if not the opin-
ion, in Smith. See William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 308 (1991).
227. Smith, 494 U.S. at 872.
228. Id. at-.
229. Id. at - (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)). Justice Scalia's
majority opinion quoted this passage twice. See Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1600, 1603; see also id. at
1606 (rejecting "a system in which each conscience is a law to itself"). Interestingly, there is a
critique of the idea that "every man is the law to himself" in Leo XIII's 1888 encyclical,
Libertas Praestantissimum (June 20, 1888). See CLAUDIA CARLENIHM, THE PAPAL EN-
CYCLICALS 1878-1903 (1990). Leo was critiquing the notion of "independent morality," that
is, the idea that morality is purely subjective. Id. This critique is a common theme in Catholic
moral teaching. See Cardinal Ratzinger, Doctrinal Document on Threats to Life Proposed.
Address to Cardinals Meeting, 20 ORIGINS 755, 757 (1991) (including a critique of "an individ-
ualistic view of freedom, understood as the absolute right to self-determination on the basis of
one's own convictions").
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for government attempts to enforce public morality that characterizes the
more recent substantive due process cases.23°
The liberals (Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall) dissented,2 31 just
as they have in other recent cases where the Court had rejected free exercise
claims.2 32 As the privatization thesis suggests, the liberal Justices are sup-
portive of religious liberty when "religion" is not seeking to undertake a
direct public or culture-forming task. These Justices' pro-religion votes in
the constitutionally compelled exemption cases are, therefore, consistent
with the broader theory defended here. As Smith indicates, these Justices
support those who dissent on religious grounds from public morality. These
votes are in accord with their votes in substantive due process cases.233 In
contrast, these Justices routinely oppose religion when it undertakes a public
role.
II. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Typically, an analysis of the substantive due process doctrine does not
involve an examination of religious issues. Under modern substantive due
process cases, state statutes were not found unconstitutional because they
promoted religious ends. Griswold v. Connecticut,234 for example, contains
virtually no mention of the fact that the anti-contraception statute com-
230. See infra Section II.
231. In Smith, Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment. She disagreed with the major-
ity's elimination of the doctrine of free exercise exemptions, but concluded that the free exer-
cise claim ought to be rejected under the "compelling interest" standard the Court has
traditionally used in the free exercise area. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1615. Justice Blackmun wrote
a dissent, which was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Agreeing with Justice
O'Connor's view that the compelling interest test should apply, the dissent also found that the
denial of unemployment benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause because "religious use of
peyote is not sufficiently compelling to outweigh respondents' right to the free exercise of their
religion." Id. at 1622 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
232. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988)
(Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented from the holding that the Free Exercise
Clause does not prohibit the government from permitting timber harvesting and road con-
struction in an area of a national forest traditionally used by Indians for religious purposes);
Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and
O'Connor dissented from the holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not prohibit the Air
Force from preventing an Orthodox Jew from wearing a yarmulke). Justice Stevens, who
usually votes with the "liberals" in Establishment Clause cases, votes with the "conservatives"
in cases rejecting free exercise claims. His position seems to be hostile to religion; he does not
draw the public/private distinction that seems important for the other "liberals."
233. See Gedicks, supra note 100, at 121; Bradley, Caesar's Religion, supra note 15; infra
Section III (discussing substantive due process).
234. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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ported with the moral teachings of many religions.2 35 Similarly, Roe v.
Wade2 3 6 does not rest explicitly on the grounds that anti-abortion statutes
were sectarian, although some prominent commentators defended Roe on
Establishment Clause grounds.
237
Some commentators, however, contend that the Establishment Clause
helps explain modem privacy cases. Professor David Richards made this
point clearly, stating that "coercive constraints on the exercise of the right to
privacy have become constitutionally suspect when, in contemporary cir-
cumstances, they can no longer be justified to society in the non-sectarian
terms that constitutional principles require. '2 38 Thus, according to Profes-
sor Richards, laws prohibiting the use of contraceptives, abortion, and con-
sensual adult homosexual acts are unconstitutional because they cannot be
justified in non-sectarian terms.2 39 This view has commanded increasing at-
tention in recent substantive due process cases, most prominently in the re-
cent opinions of Justice Stevens,2 "' and in some law review articles.
2 4 1
235. Justice Stewart did note this point in his dissent. Id. at 529 n.2 (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing). Some commentators have emphasized the role of religious organizations in supporting
birth control legislation. See, e.g., Mary L. Dudziak, Just Say No: Birth Control in the Con-
necticut Supreme Court Before Griswold v. Connecticut, 75 IOWA L. REV. 915, 927-31 (1990)
(discussing the role of the Catholic Church in preventing the repeal of Connecticut's contra-
ception statute).
236. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
237. See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21-25 (1973). Profes-
sor Tribe has now abandoned this position. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE
CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 116 (1990); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
§ 15-10, at 1350 (2d ed. 1988). For an analysis of Professor Tribe's views on abortion, see
Charles E. Rice, Tribe on Legalized Abortion: Where There's a Will There's a Way, 4 BENCH-
MARK 155 (1990); David M. Smolin, Why Abortion Rights Are Not Justified by Reference to
Gender Equality: A Response to Professor Tribe, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 621 (1990) (review-
ing LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990)).
238. David A.J. Richards, Liberalism, Public Morality, and Constitutional Law: Prolegome-
non to a Theory of the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 123, 141
(1988).
239. See, e.g., DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM 202 (1989); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 255 (1986).
240. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2878 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 560 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians &
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
241. See, e.g., David R. Dow, The Establishment Clause Argument for Choice, 20 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 479 (1990); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA.
L. REV. 955, 1025-27 (1984); Robert L. Maddox & Blaine Bortnick, Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services: Do Legislative Declarations that Life Begins at Conception Violate the Estab-
lishment Clause?, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 1 (1989); Paul D. Simmons, Religious Liberty and the
Abortion Debate, 32 J. CHURCH & ST. 567 (1990); John M. Cummings, Jr., Comment, The
State, the Stork, and the Walk The Establishment Clause and Statutory Abortion Regulation,
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Because this position so clearly expresses the privatization thesis, an exami-
nation of the public role of religion242 that is reflected in the modem sub-
stantive due process cases is warranted.24 3
This section begins by identifying how the privatization thesis has mani-
fested itself in substantive due process doctrine. It then discusses why the
privatization thesis has appealed to some Justices and commentators. Next,
the Article focuses on the deficiencies of the privatization thesis. In this
context, the privatization thesis errs by confusing morality with religion.
The privatization thesis really reflects a hostility to the government enforc-
ing moral norms that are external to the individual. This section then dis-
cusses the specific contexts in which the privatization thesis ought to be
excluded from substantive due process debates.2"
The modern substantive due process cases began with the contraception
and abortion cases.2 45 These decisions do not contain any explicit argu-
ments that religion should not play a role in influencing secular legislation.
Justice Stewart's dissent in Griswold noted that no argument was made that
the Connecticut statute violated the religion clauses.246 In fact, the various
opinions in Griswold and Roe seem to be quite respectful of the moral teach-
39 CATH. U. L. REV. 1191 (1990); Karen F.B. Gray, Comment, An Establishment Clause
Analysis of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 24 GA. L. REV. 399 (1990); Sherryl E.
Michaelson, Note, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of Establishment
Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 301 (1984).
242. This discussion broadly uses the term "religion." The term refers to moral judgments
that may be religiously influenced. The relationship between religion and morality is quite
complex. See GREENAWALT, supra note 11. For purposes of this discussion, I do not need to
describe the relationship precisely, because all of the issues discussed below involve the tempo-
ral realm in the sense that they deal with human behavior. They do not involve matters of
pure religious belief, such as belief in the Trinity.
243. The privatization thesis is frequently invoked in substantive due process cases without
reliance on the Establishment Clause. A more typical statement of the position is that relig-
iously-influenced moral judgments should be regarded as irrelevant to the constitutionality of
the legislation being challenged because such judgments do not constitute "secular" interests
that the government is limited to advancing. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 208-13
(1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring).
244. The privatization thesis comes up in two contexts: (1) in characterizing a "liberty"
interest as "fundamental" and (2) in evaluating whether the state interest is "compelling." In
the latter context, excluding the privatization thesis would force us to evaluate the state inter-
est without relying on "sectarian" label.
245. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See generally
Myers, supra note 20.
246. 381 U.S. at 528-29 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart further commented: "To
be sure, the injunction contained in the Connecticut statute coincides with the doctrine of
certain religious faiths. But if that were enough to invalidate a law under the provisions of the




ings of religious denominations. For example, Justice Blackmun's discussion
of the history of abortion in Roe does not reflect any animus to the influence
of religion on the law of abortion. 47
The contraception and abortion cases, however, are hostile to the idea that
the government can enforce moral norms external to the individual. There-
fore, the opinions are hostile to an idea traditionally associated with reli-
gion. Many of the opinions implicitly affirm the view that it is the
individual who is the source of morality. 49 In Griswold, for example, no
one, not even the state of Connecticut, defended the moral judgment embod-
ied in the Connecticut statute that the use of contraceptives is immoral.2 5 0
Justice Stewart, in defending the law's constitutionality, captured the pre-
247. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 130-47, 160-61; see also Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg,
J., concurring); id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (incorporating portions of his opinion in Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 539-55 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
248. See Levinson, supra note 1, at 1070 (noting that the Roman Catholic Church believes
in "the existence of moral claims upon us, the content of which can be known through the
disciplined application of human reason").
249. Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641,
663 (1990).
For classical liberals, it is the individual, not the community, who is the Authority on
the nature of the good, not only with respect to religious beliefs and political ideas
(separately insulated from community control by the first amendment), but also with
respect to ways of life. Consequently, legislation that interferes with such individual
authority is strongly disfavored, and properly subject to constitutional check. The
obvious importance of Bowers is that it was the first 'privacy' case to reject defini-
tively this classically liberal and individualist account of the good, of law, and hence
of the constitutional right to privacy, and adopt in its stead a conservative communi-
tarian conception.
Id. One could, of course, take the position that there are moral norms external to the individ-
ual, but that the government, as an expression of tolerance, ought not to enforce them. That
position is not expressed, however, when one concludes that there is a fundamental constitu-
tional right to engage in the activity in question. For example, the conclusion that homosexual
sodomy is within the right of privacy
would be a public declaration that in the eyes of society and its laws, sexual prefer-
ences are merely that-personal and subjective preferences of no objective validity
and no public importance. That view may ... be the correct one, but it is not a
neutral refusal to hold any view at all.
Francis Canavan, The Pluralist Game, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 33 (1981). Indeed,
Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick is a quite explicit rejection of the notion that
there are objective moral norms on issues of sexual morality. See Myers, supra note 20, at 604
(discussing Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers).
250. Justice White's opinion in Griswold noted that "[tihere is no serious contention that
Connecticut thinks the use of artificial or external methods of contraception immoral or un-
wise in itself." 381 U.S. at 505 (White, J., concurring). Just four years earlier in Poe v. Ull-
man, the state of Connecticut had defended the anti-contraception law in such terms. See Poe,
367 U.S. at 545 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The State... asserts that it is acting to protect the
moral welfare of its citizenry ... in that it considers the practice of contraception immoral in
itself .. ").
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vailing sentiment: "As a philosophical matter, I believe the use of contra-
ceptives in the relationship of marriage should be left to personal and private
choice, based upon each individual's moral, ethical, and religious beliefs." 25'
Similarly, Justice Blackmun's opinion in Roe rejects the notion that the
state, or at least the state legislature, is permitted to take a position on the
question of when life begins.252 In his view, the question is insoluble. After
considering the disagreement on the issue,253 Justice Blackmun concluded
that a state legislature is not permitted to take a position on the question, at
least not if the position it adopted would prohibit abortions.254
Recently, substantive due process cases have brought the "religious" as-
pects of this debate into clearer focus. Perhaps the most striking aspect of
the recent cases is the extent to which certain Justices have explicitly ac-
cepted the privatization thesis. Justice Stevens has been the most forthright
in this regard, as his opinions in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists,255 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,256 and
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri, Department of Health v. Reproductive Health
Services2 57 attest.
In Thornburgh, Justice Stevens' concurring opinion discussed whether the
state's interest in protecting the unborn is compelling during the entire pe-
riod of pregnancy. Justice Stevens stated: "I recognize that a powerful theo-
logical argument can be made for that position, but I believe that our
jurisdiction is limited to the evaluation of secular state interests."'25 Justice
Stevens later stated that "unless the religious view that a fetus is a 'person' is
251. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
252. See David M. Smolin, The Judeo-Christian Tradition and Self-Censorship in Legal
Discourse, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 345, 403 (1988).
253. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 159.
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in
the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive
at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge,
is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.
254. Id. at 162. As Justice White noted, the Court implicitly took a position on the ques-
tion. Id. at 222. As Professor Grano stated, "the Court necessarily rejected the legislative
judgment that fetal life deserves protection." Joseph D. Grano, Judicial Review and a Written
Constitution in a Democratic Society, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 24 (1981); see Carl E. Schneider,
State-Interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment "Privacy" Law: An Essay on the Constitution-
alization of Social Issues, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 115 (1988); Myers, supra note 20,
at 610. In fact, Justice Blackmun did endorse the view that he found reflected in the relevant
legal materials, namely, that "the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in
the whole sense." Roe, 410 U.S. at 162.
255. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
256. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
257. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990)
258. 476 U.S. at 778 (Stevens, J., concurring)
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adopted... there is a fundamental and well-recognized difference between a
fetus and a human being; indeed, if there is not such a difference, the permis-
sibility of terminating the life of a fetus could scarcely be left to the will of
the state legislatures.
259
In Webster, Justice Stevens concluded that the preamble to Missouri's
abortion statute violated the Establishment Clause.2 ' The preamble stated
that "[t]he life of each human being begins at conception" and that
"[u]nborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-be-
ing. ' '26 1 The preamble required that all Missouri laws be interpreted to pro-
vide unborn children with the same rights enjoyed by other persons, subject
to the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent. 2 62 According to Justice
Stevens, "the absence of any secular purpose for the legislative declarations
that life begins at conception and that conception occurs at fertilization
makes the relevant portion of the preamble invalid under the Establishment
Clause. '2 63 That conclusion was based on Justice Stevens' conviction "that
259. IdL at 779; see Schneider, supra note 254, at 115; see also Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 795-
96 n.4 (White, J., dissenting) (responding to Justice Steven's position).
260. Justice Stevens also stated that because the preamble threatens to interfere with con-
traceptive choices it is unconstitutional under Griswold and subsequent cases involving access
to contraceptives. 492 U.S. at 564 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Professor Smolin has noted that Justice Stevens is wrong in asserting that a state that protected
human life from conception would interfere with common forms of contraception. See David
M. Smolin, Abortion Legislation After Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: Model Stat-
utes and Commentaries, 20 CUMB. L. REv. 71, 121-28 (1989). Interestingly, Justice Stevens
noted that "there was unquestionably a theological basis for the Connecticut statute that the
Court invalidated in Griswold." 492 U.S. at 566.
261. Mo. ANN. STAT §§ 1.205.1(1)-(2) (Vernon Supp. 1991).
262. Id. The preamble provided in full:
1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being;
(3) The natural parents of unborn children have protectable interests in the
life, health, and well-being of their unborn child.
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of the state shall be interpreted and con-
strued to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development,
all the rights, privileges and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and resi-
dents of this state, subject only to the Constitution of the United States, and deci-
sional interpretations thereof by the United States Supreme Court and specific
provisions to the contrary in the statutes and constitution of this state.
3. As used in this section, the term 'unborn children' or 'unborn child' shall in-
clude all unborn child or children or the offspring of human beings from the moment
of conception until birth at every stage of biological development.
4. Nothing in this section should be interpreted as creating a cause of action
against a woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing to properly care
for herself or by failing to follow any particular program of prenatal care.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205. '
263. Webster, 492 U.S. at 566 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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the preamble, an unequivocal endorsement of a religious tenet of some but
by no means all Christian faiths, serves no identifiable secular purpose."26 4
Moreover, Justice Stevens noted that his view that the state of Missouri had
provoked political division along religious lines by endorsing the view of a
particular religious tradition supported his Establishment Clause analysis.2 6
More recently, in a dissenting opinion to Cruzan v. Director, Missouri De-
partment of Health,26 6 Justice Stevens again took the view that the state of
Missouri was inappropriately attempting to protect a theological interest. In
Cruzan, the majority held that Missouri could constitutionally refuse to
honor the request of Nancy Cruzan's parents to withdraw her nutrition and
hydration.2 67 In contrast, Justice Stevens maintained that Missouri had no
proper interest in the preservation of the life of Nancy Cruzan.2 6 He con-
cluded that the state's assertion of an interest in Nancy Cruzan's physical
existence was "an effort to define life." 269 Further, he stated that the state's
definition of life to include Nancy Cruzan could only be based upon "some
theological abstraction." 270 Finally, Justice Stevens decided that "to posit
such a basis for the State's action is to condemn it. It is not within the
province of secular government to circumscribe the liberties of the people by
regulations designed wholly for the purpose of establishing a sectarian defini-
tion of life.",
271
264. Id. at 566-67 (footnote omitted).
265. Id. at 571. Justice Stevens' comment on "political divisiveness" illustrates the short-
comings of such an inquiry. See supra notes 86-103, 159-66 and accompanying text. Holding
the preamble to the Missouri statute unconstitutional would not likely reduce the level of
discord. As Professor Tribe, a supporter of abortion rights, has noted: "It seems likely...
that any legal approach to abortion will generate religious fragmentation; it cannot follow that
all possible approaches violate the establishment clause." TRIBE, supra note 53, § 14-14 at
1281; see also id. at 1350. A Supreme Court decision advocating Justice Stevens' view might
make things worse. See generally GuiDo CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND
THE LAW: PRIVATE LAW PERSPECTIVES ON A PUBLIC LAW PROBLEM 95-97 (1st ed. 1985).
266. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
267. Id. at 2853-55. For a brief discussion of Cruzan, see NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note
53, at 812-16. The authors of this treatise note that "Cruzan did not establish a right to die."
Id. at 816.
268. Justice Stevens seems to have concluded that Nancy Cruzan was in fact already dead.
Justice Stevens stated that "Nancy Cruzan is obviously 'alive' in a physiological sense. But for
patients like Nancy Cruzan, who have no consciousness and no chance of recovery, there is a
serious question as to whether the mere persistence of their bodies is 'life' as that word is
commonly understood, or as it is used in both the Constitution and the Declaration of Inde-
pendence." 110 S. Ct. at 2886 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 2887.
271. Id. at 2888. In support of this proposition, Justice Stevens cited his Webster dissent.
Justice Stevens later commented that "the only apparent secular basis for the State's interest in
life is the policy's persuasive impact upon people other than Nancy and her family." Id. at
2889. Earlier in his dissent, he had stated: "The more precise constitutional significance of
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Although he has not yet followed Justice Stevens' lead in explicitly invok-
ing the Establishment Clause in recent privacy cases, Justice Blackmun's
opinions also reflect the privatization thesis. For example, in his dissent in
Bowers v. Hardwick,272 Justice Blackmun claimed that "[t]he assertion that
'traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe' [homosexual sodomy] cannot
provide an adequate justification for [the statute] .... The legitimacy of secu-
lar legislation depends instead on whether the State can advance some justifi-
cation for its law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine." '273 Justice
Blackmun did not view the traditional religious condemnation of sodomy as
a justification for the Georgia statute:
[Flar from buttressing his case, petitioner's invocation of Leviticus,
Romans, St. Thomas Aquinas, and sodomy's heretical status dur-
ing the Middle Ages undermines his suggestion that [the statute]
represents a legitimate use of secular coercive power. A State can
no more punish private behavior because of religious intolerance
than it can punish such behavior because of racial animus.274
In his passionate dissent in Webster, Justice Blackmun explicitly endorsed
Justice Stevens' rejection in Thornburgh of the argument that the state has a
compelling interest in the fetus throughout pregnancy.275 In Thornburgh,
Justice Stevens rejected the compelling interest argument because he thought
it relied on a religious view about the status of the fetus.276
Interestingly, Thornburgh, Webster, and Cruzan fail to define key terms,
such as "religion," "sectarian," or "secular." The substantive due process
cases do not involve what might be regarded as pure matters of religious
belief. For example, the cases do not involve the enforcement of laws requir-
ing a belief in the Trinity or transubstantiation. Instead all of the cases ad-
dress the temporal realm in the sense that they deal with human behavior. 7
death is difficult to describe; not much may be said with confidence about death unless it is said
from faith, and that alone is reason enough to protect the freedom to conform choices about
death to individual conscience." Id. at 2885. This statement captures the essence of the priva-
tization thesis-if the matter touches "religion" or "faith" it is not a proper public concern.
272. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
273. Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens joined Justice Blackmun's dissent. See also Webster, 492 U.S. at 558 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2993 (1990) (Black-
mun, J., dissenting) (referring to "professed moral or religious grounds" to object to abortion).
274. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211-12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). Other
passages in the opinion also reflect this sensibility. E.g., id. at 200, 205, 211 n.6, 212-13; see
also Akron Ctr., 110 S. Ct. at 2993 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See generally Gerard V. Brad-
ley, Remaking the Constitution: A Critical Reexamination of the Bowers v. Hardwick Dissent,
25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 501 (1990).
275. Webster, 492 U.S. at 490 552-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
276. See supra notes 258-59.
277. See Smith, supra note 32, at 969-71, 1000-07.
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Yet, according to the privatization thesis, the state statutes involved in these
cases touch on religious matters.
The most extensive treatment has been Justice Stevens' discussion of what
he regards as "sectarian" views of human life.27 For example, in Thorn-
burgh, Justice Stevens categorized the position that the State has a compel-
ling interest in the unborn from conception to birth as necessarily
theological. He also stated that the State's position that the fetus is a "per-
son" is religious.279 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens did not explain why these
positions are theological or religious.280 His conclusion seems to be based on
the idea that his view-that the state's interest increases with the state of
development-is "obvious," 2 ' "fundamental and well-recognized,"28 2 and
"supported not only by logic, but also by history and by our shared exper-
iences."2 3 Justice Stevens views the state interest in protecting human life
as varying "as the organism's capacity to feel pain, to experience pleasure, to
survive, and to react to its surroundings increases day by day."2 4 While
this view is not uncommon,28 5 Justice Stevens never explained why an alter-
native view is "religious." 2 6 In fact, as Justice White's dissenting opinion
points out, there is no reason to consider either of the two competing views
278. As noted, in Webster, Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall endorsed Justice
Stevens' view on this issue. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 566-67.
279. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747, 779 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).
280. Id
281. Id. at 778.
282. Id at 779.
283. Id. (footnote omitted). It is not clear to whom "our" refers. See infra note 297 and
accompanying text (offering a suggestion).
284. Id. at 778.
285. In the literature on issues such as abortion and euthanasia, many commentators assert
that a human being does not have an interest in continued life unless the individual has some
capacity for social interaction. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser, Relitigating Life and Death, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 425, 428-29 (1990); Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 375, 441-42 (1988) ("A vitalist believes that life, in and of itself, is a good worth preserv-
ing. In my view, however, a more plausible solution is that life is a precondition for the exper-
iencing of human goods, and is no longer inherently beneficial."); Jed Rubenfeld, On the Legal
Status of the Proposition that "Life Begins at Conception," 43 STAN. L. REV. 599, 623, 626
(1991) ("To insist that personhood be understood as the attainment of a certain level of human
development, rather than as the potential for such development, is ultimately to insist that a
person must be distinguished from the biological material of which he is made."). This ap-
proach is quite controversial. See Germain Grisez, Should Nutrition and Hydration Be Pro-
vided to Permanently Unconscious and Other Mentally Disabled Persons?, 5 IssuEs IN LAW &
MED. 165, 172-73 (1989) (adopting an opposing position).
286. See Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 795 n.4 (White, J., dissenting) ("Justice Stevens omits
any real effort to defend his judgment.").
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sketched by Justice Stevens as religious. Put differently, there is no reason to
consider one position religious and the other secular.28 7
Justice Stevens' dissent in Webster is no more clear on this point. He
again asserted that there is no "secular" basis for the state to claim an inter-
est in human life immediately after fertilization. 2 8 He stated: "As a secular
matter, there is an obvious difference between the state interest in protecting
the freshly fertilized egg and the state interest in protecting a 9-month-ges-
tated, fully sentient fetus on the eve of birth.' 28 9 Apparently, the only secu-
lar interest involved in protecting human life is preventing "physical pain or
mental anguish."'2 ' To Justice Stevens, this is all "obvious." Even if one
agreed with the controversial conclusion that the states' interest increased
throughout pregnancy, Justice Stevens never explains why his view is secu-
lar, while the position that the state has an interest in human life at each
stage of development is "religious." He seems to regard this position as
"religious" because he erroneously thinks it relies on the existence of a soul
from the moment of conception.2 91 The Roman Catholic Church, for exam-
ple, does not take a position on the time of ensoulment or on the beginning
of human personhood.2 92 The position that early abortion is wrong is based
287. Id. Justice Blackmun is no more helpful in explaining the secular-religious distinc-
tion. His opinion in Webster, which endorsed Justice Stevens' discussion in Thornburgh, does
not explain the distinction. Webster, 492 U.S. at 552-53. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), is no more informative. In Bowers, Justice Blackmun re-
jected the view that the moral judgment the state of Georgia advanced in support of its anti-
sodomy statute, namely that homosexual sodomy is immoral, provided an adequate justifica-
tion. He stated: "The legitimacy of secular legislation depends... on whether the State can
advance some justification for its law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine." Id. at 211
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although the state of Georgia had relied in part on the long his-
tory of religious groups condemning homosexual sodomy, id., Justice Blackmun never ex-
plained why the moral view expressed by the statute was inevitably religious. There are of
course those who condemn homosexual sodomy without invoking "religious" justifications.
See John M. Finnis, Legal Enforcement of "Duties to Oneself". Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87
COLUM L. REV. 433, 445 n.60 (1987); John M. Finnis, Personal Integrity, Sexual Morality and
Responsible Parenthood, in ANTHROPOS: RiVISTADI STUDI SULLA PERSONA E LA FAMIGLIA,
43-55 (1985).
288. 492 U.S. at 569 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
289. Id.
290. Id.; see also id. at 572 ("sensation and movement"); Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2886-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasizing consciousness).
291. See 492 U.S. at 569 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing ensoulment); Thornburgh, 476
U.S. at 778 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring). Notably, Justice Stevens stated that the preamble is a
religious tenet. Webster, 492 U.S. at 566 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
292. See Joseph Card. Ratzinger, Instruction on Respect for Human Life in Its Origin and
on the Dignity of Procreation, ORIGINS, March 19, 1987, at 13 (statement of Congregation for
the Doctrine of the Faith) ("The Magisterium has not expressly committed itself to an affirma-
tion of a philosophical nature [about ensoulment], but it constantly reaffirms the moral con-
demnation of any kind of procured abortion."); John R. Connery, S.J., The Ancients and the
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on the "fundamental and well-recognized" fact that human life begins at
conception 293 and that human life is inherently good. 294 There is nothing
purely "religious" about this argument; it does not depend on appeals to
biblical authority.295
Justices Stevens and Blackmun have not taken the position that a view is
"religious" simply because it conforms to the teaching of some religious or-
ganizations. Indeed, Justice Stevens has expressly disassociated himself
from that position. 296 This fact suggests that the privatization of religion
thesis is viewed in a selective manner. It is only when religiously-influenced
moral judgments depart from the Justices' own moral views2 97 that they are
considered objectionable. In Professor Bradley's phrase, "[W]here religious
morality exceeds liberalism, the liberal constitutionalism of our Establish-
ment Clause overrules it." '298 Thus, the privatization thesis is invoked only
when religion makes a difference; only when that possibility exists is it neces-
sary to raise the specter of religious oppression. Characterizing a position as
religious then serves to discount the position without having to challenge it
forthrightly. Using the "religious" label ends the debate, while reinforcing
the conclusions that are likely to be reached by members of this social
group.
299
Medievals on Abortion: The Consensus the Court Ignored, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITU-
TION: REVERSING Roe v. Wade THROUGH THE COURTS 123, 126 (Dennis J. Horan et al. eds.
1987).
293. John M. Finnis, Natural Law and the Rights of the Unborn, in ABORTION AND THE
CONSTITUTION: REVERSING Roe v. Wade THROUGH THE COURTS 115, 116, 119 (Dennis J.
Horan et. al. eds. 1987); Rice, supra note 237, at 156 ("The most troublesome obstacle for any
proponent of legalized abortion is the verifiable fact that each abortion, at whatever stage of
pregnancy, kills a human being.").
294. See, e.g., John Finnis, The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Thom-
son, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 117 (1972); Grisez, supra note 285, at 172-73; William E. May et al.,
Feeding and Hydrating the Permanently Unconscious and Other Vulnerable Persons, 3 ISSUES
IN LAW & MED. 203, 204 (1987).
295. Natural law reasoning supports the argument. See Finnis, supra note 294. "It is
sometimes said that one cannot accept the doctrine of natural law unless one has antecedently
accepted 'its Roman Catholic presuppositions.' This, of course, is quite wrong. The doctrine
of natural law has no Roman Catholic presuppositions." JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, WE
HOLD THESE TRUTHS 109 (1960).
296. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 566 (Stevens, J., dissenting);
see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 634 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (agreeing with
Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis that AFLA had a secular purpose and did not serve a reli-
gious objective because some of the statute's goals coincided with the beliefs of certain religious
denominations). But see id. at 639 n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the chastity
issue is inevitably religious).
297. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 779 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to our shared experiences).
298. Gerard Bradley, Caesar's Religion, 15 HUM. LIFE REV. 52, 60 (1989).
299. See Bradley, supra note 289; Schneider, supra note 254, at 115.
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Two other theories may help to understand how these Justices use the
religious-secular distinction. First, the use of religion demonstrates the Jus-
tices' hostility to the idea that there are moral norms external to the individ-
ual. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Bowers most clearly expresses the
commitment to the idea that it is the individual who creates his own moral-
ity. There, Justice Blackmun stated:
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way
through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in
a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many "right" ways
of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of
a relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to
choose the form and nature of these intensely personal bonds.3 ° °
There are, of course, those who support Justice Blackmun's view of morality
even though it is hotly contested.3 °1 Justice Blackmun's position is not
strengthened, however, by labelling the opposing view "religious." Again,
the religious label is used to dismiss an argument, not to meet it forthrightly.
The strength of the view that the Constitution incorporates Mill's On Liberty
ought to be evaluated directly, not by labelling one's adversaries religious.
30 2
Second, the religious label seems to be used to describe beliefs that the
Justices believe are not "rational." This point, which draws on a significant
body of literature,30 3 deserves more extended elaboration. Justice Black-
mun's opinion in Webster is illustrative. After endorsing Justice Stevens'
conclusion in Thornburgh that fetal personhood was a religious view, Justice
Blackmun then defended the viability standard he had crafted in Roe:
The viability line reflects the biological facts and truths of fetal de-
velopment; it marks that threshold moment prior to which a fetus
cannot survive separate from the woman and cannot reasonably
300. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see also id.
at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (addressing "private morality"). Justice Blackmun's opinion
is filled with constant invocations of the words "private" and "intimate". See John M. Finnis,
Legal Enforcement of "Duties to Oneself'" Kant v. Neo-Kantians, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 433,
443 n.46 (1987); see also BORK, supra note 39, at 120-26, 247, 249-50 (discussing Justice Black-
mun's dissent in Bowers); Bradley, supra note 274 (critiquing Justice Blackmun's dissent in
Bowers); Bruce C. Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belong-
ing, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8-18 (same).
301. See Myers, supra note 20, at 604.
302. Id. See generally Bradley, supra note 274, at 519-20.
303. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980);
DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1989); DAVID
A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986); David A.J. Richards, Book
Review, 23 GA. L. REV. 1189 (1989); Robert Audi, The Separation of Church and State and
the Obligations of Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 259 (1989).
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and objectively be regarded as a subject of rights or interests dis-
tinct from, or paramount to, those of the pregnant woman.
The divide seems to be reason, logic, and scientific truth on the one hand and
religious dogma on the other.
30 5
That view should be rejected. Although the invocation of "rationality"
has powerful appeal, it suffers from grave infirmities. That framework often
fails to recognize that the conception of "rationality" that is invoked to settle
important public policy disputes is highly partisan.
The claim that there are rational principles, independent of a meta-
physic or a theology, capable of resolving conflicts between groups
with competing interests has shown itself to be empty. There are
in fact competing and contradictory understandings of rationality
and justice, resting on fiduciary formulations which are now rarely
examined and whose importance and indeed existence is frequently
denied.3° 6
Consider, for example, the discussions of abortion by David Richards and
John Finnis. Richards defends Roe, in part, on the ground that the state's
304. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 553 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) (emphasis added). The change in Justice Blackmun's tone from Roe is striking. He is
not cautious here, as he seemed to be in Roe. His Webster dissent is full of confident assertions
about the truth on abortion, in contrast to his relativism in other contexts. See, e.g., id. at 554
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("In Roe, we discharged that responsibility as logic and science
compelled. The plurality today advances not one reasonable argument as to why our judgment
in that case was wrong and should be abandoned."). See generally Smolin, supra note 252, at
407-08 (commenting on the change in Justice Blackmun's approach).
305. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 640 (1988) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("reli-
gious dogma"). By "dogma" Justice Blackmun seems to mean, as Webster's says, "a point of
view or tenet put forth as authoritative without adequate grounds." WEBSTER'S NEW COL-
LEGIATE DICTIONARY 337 (1977). This view is essentially that of Professor Richards. See,
e.g., David A.J. Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy and Constitutional Privacy, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 800, 849 (1986).
306. D. FORRESTER, BELIEFS, VALUES AND POLICIES: CONVICTION POLITICS IN A SECU-
LAR AGE 5 (1989). Here Forrester draws on Alasdair MacIntyre's recent work. See ALAS-
DAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY (1990); ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988). Professor Michael Perry
made this same point in a similar fashion:
There are, of course, competing conceptions of rationality-that is, competing sets of
criteria for determining what beliefs to accept and what beliefs to reject. No privi-
leged standpoint exists from which to adjudicate among competing conceptions of
rationality-no standpoint that does not itself presuppose a particular conception of
rationality.
Michael J. Perry, Comment on "The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Convic-
tion: Protecting Animals and the Environment", 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1067, 1067-68
(1986); see also HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 73-74
(1974); Richard A. Baer, Jr., The Supreme Court's Discriminatory Use of the Term "Sectar-
ian," 6 J.L. & POL. 449, 461-63 (1990); Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932, 938-39 (1989).
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interest in fetal life is not sufficient to justify prohibiting abortion. Richards
concludes that it is not "reasonable" for the state to claim a compelling in-
terest in the fetus throughout pregnancy because the belief that the fetus is a
full moral person throughout pregnancy is "not reasonably shared at
large"3"7 and because the fetus "lacks relevant characteristics of being a per-
son-at a minimum, the capacity for self-consciousness, agency and the
like."308 In contrast, Finnis argues that abortion is the "denial of right,
which is also a denial of the basic arguments of human reason ...
[A]bortion is one of the most destructive philosophical and practical errors
perpetuated by modem culture. '3 "9 The basic justification for Finnis's view
is that it is wrong to directly attack human life,310 and that human life be-
gins at conception.311
Both of these positions are "reasonable," if one gives the term a liberal
construction. What seems apparent is that Richards and Finnis operate in
different worlds.3 2 Their disagreements reflect different traditions and dif-
ferent ways of understanding "rationality." Thus, Richards' dismissal of
Finnis' reasoning as "sectarian' ' 313 means only that Finnis does not share
Richards's particular partisan conception of rationality.
The counterargument to this response claims that the Constitution specifi-
cally incorporates the liberal account of rationality. The argument can be
summarized in this fashion: "The Establishment Clause should be viewed as
a reflection of the secular, relativist political values of the Enlightenment,
which are incompatible with the fundamental nature of religious faith. As
an embodiment of these Enlightenment values, the Establishment Clause re-
quires that the political influence of religion be substantially diminished.
' '314
Although Justice Blackmun does not offer an extended argument in support
of the view that the Constitution necessarily requires the exclusion of views
307. DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 263 (1986).
308. Id. at 264.
309. Finnis, supra note 293, at 119.
310. Id. at 118; Finnis, supra note 294, at 132.
311. Finnis, supra note 293, at 116, 119.
312. Their disagreements extend to other issues as well. Compare RICHARDS, supra note
303, at 258-61 (contraception) and id. at 268-80 (homosexual acts) with Grisez et al., "Every
Marital Act Ought to be Open to New Life" Toward a Clearer Understanding, 52 THE THO-
MIST 365 (1988) (contraception) and Finnis, supra note 300, at 445 n.60 (homosexual acts).
Note that those who take Richards' position on abortion, which emphasizes that a human
being needs a certain level of self-consciousness before it is entitled to legal protection, have a
difficult time defending prohibitions on infanticide. See Michael Tooley, Abortion and Infanti-
cide, 2 PHIL. & Pun. AFF. 37 (1972) (defending infanticide); Cf Finnis, supra note 293, at 118
(criticizing infanticide).
313. See, e.g., Richards, supra note 238, at 146-47; Richards, supra note 305, at 849-50.
314. Gey, supra note 43, at 79.
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that fail to conform to his conception of rationality, he views the require-
ment of "secular reasons" as a necessary implication of our democratic sys-
tem. This view, although quite common, is profoundly mistaken. In the late
twentieth century, it is possible to contemplate "a wholly secular govern-
ment and politic[al culture]." '3 15 Yet, the claim that there is a "constitu-
tional command of secular government" 316 misrepresents the extent to
which the religion clauses embody a rigid separation between religion and
government.
Professor Smith's assessment bears repeating:
If the possibility of separating church and state presented eigh-
teenth century Americans with a genuine option, the separation of
politics and religion, or of government and religion, did not. Reli-
gious premises, assumptions, and values provided the general
framework within which most Americans thought about and dis-
cussed important philosophical, moral, and political issues. For
that reason, Americans of the time could not seriously contemplate
a thoroughly secular political culture from which religious beliefs,
motives, purposes, rhetoric, and practices would be filtered out.
3 17
Moreover, although secular rationalism is part of the American tradition,
privileging that conception of rationality would do violence to the views of
most Americans, 3 " the vast majority of whom believe that morality is de-
rived from religion. Granted, a small segment of the population, including
prominent scholars, believes that liberal democracy requires the screening of
public life from the influence of moral views that are not justified in wholly
secular terms. Nonetheless, it seems difficult to accept a position that is in-
consistent with most of the country's history and the experience of most
people in contemporary America. a19
315. Smith, supra note 32, at 975.
316. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 611.
317. Smith, supra note 32, at 966; see ELLIS SANDOZ, A GOVERNMENT OF LAWS 128
(1990) (challenging the view that the Constitution's Framers intended to create a purely secu-
lar government); see also Daniel L. Dreisbach, A New Perspective on Jefferson's Views on
Church-State Relations: The Virginia Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom in its Legisla-
tive Context, 35 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 172, 204 (1991) ("The 'wall,' however, was never meant
to effect a complete and absolute separation between church and state prohibiting religious
influence in state-sponsored activities and laws."); McConnell, supra note 22, at 1513 (noting
that the rationalistic Enlightenment had little influence on the Free Exercise Clause).
318. See Neuhaus, Eastern Europe and the Swedish Model, FIRST THINGS, March 1991, at
57 ("[T]he overwhelming majority of Americans . . . do say that religion is the source of
morality."); Smith, supra note 32, at 1012-15.
319. The argument that legislation must be supported by secular reasons so that the public
debate can be conducted in terms that are accessible to all, see Smith, supra note 32, at 1010, is
also flawed. The secular reasoning that our liberal democracy is purported to require is foreign
to most Americans. "'Accessibility,' it turns out, has little to do with the beliefs, values, and
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In recent cases, the Court has generally rejected this manifestation of the
privatization thesis, which provides that legislation must be justified in the
terms of secular rationality. The endorsements of this version of the priva-
tization thesis are found in some dissenting opinions. Since at least 1986, a
majority of the Court now seems more accepting of religiously-influenced
moral judgments. For example, in Bowers v. Hardwick,32° Justice White's
conclusion that the fundamental right of privacy did not extend to homosex-
ual sodomy was supported by the observation that "[p]roscriptions against
that conduct have ancient roots." '32 1 In applying the rational basis test, Jus-
tice White denied that it was impermissible for the Georgia statute to reflect
a moral judgment about homosexual sodomy. Justice White stated:
The law ... is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all
laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated
under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.
Even respondent makes no such claim, but insists that majority
sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be declared
inadequate. We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the sod-
omy laws of some 25 States should be invalidated on this basis.322
Former Chief Justice Burger's separate concurrence was even more explicit
about invoking the religious influence on the Georgia statute in support of its
constitutionality. He stated that "[d]ecisions of individuals relating to ho-
mosexual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the his-
tory of Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly
rooted in Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards.
'323
Similarly, Justice Scalia's opinions reflect an acceptance of religiously-in-
fluenced moral judgments. Typically, Justice Scalia does not advocate that
religiously-influenced moral judgments should play an important role in in-
fluencing legislation. His approach, as one might expect from a professed
reasons that the actual citizens in a democracy do in fact understand and use." Id. at 1015; see
Baer, supra note 306, at 463. Similarly, many of the conclusions that purportedly flow from
this version of our constitutional scheme depart radically from the moral views of most Ameri-
cans. See DAVID RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH AND THE LAW 116-21, 185-89 (1982) (the
constitutional right of privacy protects prostitution and drug use). These views suggest that
there is something wrong with the liberal account of liberal democracy. "[I]f the picture of
liberal democracy presented by academic theorists diverges from the deeply held beliefs not
only of large numbers of citizens but also of the founders of our democratic system, the obvi-
ous conclusion is that the theorists have not succeeded in capturing the meaning of our democ-
racy." Smith, supra note 32, at 1015 (footnote omitted).
320. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
321. Id. at 192.
322. Id. at 196.
323. Id. at 196 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
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adherent to judicial restraint,"' is to defer to the democratic process. Jus-
tice Scalia's approach to substantive due process is, therefore, receptive to
legislation that embodies what might be characterized as a traditional moral
position, even if that position may have been religiously-influenced. a25
In his substantive due process opinions, Justice Scalia has set forth his
approach to determining whether a fundamental right exists. For Justice
Scalia, it is necessary that a "claimant demonstrates that the State has de-
prived him of a right historically and traditionally protected against State
interference." 326 Justice Scalia's approach accepts the use of societal tradi-
tions to support the constitutionality of legislation, even when the tradition
reflects strong moral judgments. His opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.327
is instructive. The case involved the effort of Michael H. to establish his
paternity of, and obtain the right to visit, Victoria D. Victoria D. was born
to Carole D., who was married to Gerald D. Pursuant to a California stat-
ute, a child born to a married woman living with her husband is presumed to
be a child of the marriage. Someone in Michael's position, who allegedly
fathered Victoria during an affair, is not permitted to rebut the presumption.
Justice Scalia's plurality opinion, which rejected Michael's substantive due
324. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989). See
generally Richard A. Brisbin, Jr., The Conservatism of Antonin Scalia, 105 POL. SC. Q. 1
(1990); George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE L.J. 1297
(1990).
325. See West, supra note 249, at 659-60, 668, 677; Hafen, supra note 300, at 18-23. See
generally Antonin Scalia, Morality, Pragmatism and the Legal Order, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 123, 123 (1986). Justice Scalia stated:
One would be foolish to deny the relevance of moral perceptions to law. Society's
moral beliefs necessarily affect its constitutional perceptions in general and its per-
ceptions of what economic rights are protected by its constitution in particular.
There is no need to apologize for the phenomenon, even when the moral beliefs
spring from a theological belief. In any case, it is useless to rail against the phenome-
non because it is inevitable.
Id. The author does not suggest that a majority of the Justices necessarily share all aspects of
Justice Scalia's views on these issues. In fact, Justice Scalia often writes separately on substan-
tive due process issues. See, e.g., Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia is, however, typically in the majority on substantive due process questions, and thus the
Court's results suggest that it is likely to accept a role for religiously-influenced moral
judgments.
326. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859-60 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia's approach has
generated a great deal of scholarly criticism. See generally Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the
Politics of Deconstruction, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613 (1990); David A. Strauss, Tradition,
Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1699 (1991); Laurence H. Tribe &
Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057
(1990); Note, A Critique of Justice Antonin Scalia's Approach to Fundamental Rights Adjudica-
tion, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1337.
327. 491 U.S. 110 (1989). For an excellent discussion of Micheal H., see Joan C. Sylvain,
Note, Michael H. v. Gerald D. The Presumption of Paternity, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 831 (1990).
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process claim, continually referred to the "adulterous" relationship in the
course of rejecting the argument that our traditions protected Michael's ef-
fort to assert parental rights.328 According to Justice Scalia, the state is per-
mitted to act upon moral judgments.329
Similarly, in Cruzan, after noting Justice Stevens's view that life and death
decisions must be left to the private realm of conscience, Justice Scalia
stated: "This is a view that some societies have held, and that our States are
free to adopt if they wish. But it is not a view imposed by our constitutional
traditions, in which the power of the State to prohibit suicide is unquestiona-
ble.",330 In addition, in rejecting the view that the Constitution contains a
right to abortion, Justice Scalia stated in Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproduc-
tive Health: "[Such a right] is not to be found in the longstanding traditions
of our society."' 331 In Justice Scalia's view, the State is clearly permitted to
legislate on the basis of moral judgments, even on such controversial subjects
as abortion, homosexual rights, and the right to die-subjects that the dis-
senters regard as private or religious. Justice Scalia, on the contrary, would
permit these issues to be the subject of public action.
332
In sum, the Court's recent substantive due process decisions, like its re-
cent Establishment Clause decisions, have reflected the declining influence of
the privatization theory. Here, too, the changing composition of the Court
has transformed the legal doctrine. Since 1986, the Court's substantive due
process decisions are far more receptive to state legislation reflecting a moral
position, even if that position may have been religiously-influenced in some
sense. Bowers, Webster, Hodgson, Akron, and Cruzan are all consistent with
this view. There is, however, still a significant minority who explicitly en-
dorse the privatization theory. That group is in the minority, though, and it
was so even prior to the retirements of Justices Brennan and Marshall.
Currently, the legal doctrine on substantive due process issues accepts a
public role for religion, and it is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.
Those with more traditional views on moral issues, such as abortion, may
328. There are eight references to adultery in Scalia's opinion.
329. "Plainly, for Scalia the legal status of a couple has moral significance; for him natural
relationships are sometimes important, but judgments can be made about their relative moral
quality. In contrast, the mindset typified in the Brennan dissent is insistently reductionist and
relativistic." Robert F. Nagel, Constitutional Doctrine and Political Direction, TRIAL, Dec.
1989, at 72, 73; see Hafen, supra note 300, at 18-23.
330. 110 S. Ct. at 2862-63 (Scalia, J., concurring).
331. Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 110 S. Ct. 2972, 2984 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
332. Justice Scalia's position applies to other areas of constitutional law. See Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Our society prohib-
its, and all human societies have prohibited, certain activities not because they harm others but
because they are considered, in the traditional phrase, 'contra bonos mores,' i.e., immoral.").
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well not succeed in the political arena. The mixed record on abortion legis-
lation since Webster is evidence of this. These failures may be the result of
the same acceptance by some (the secularized elite, in particular) of the
privatization theory. But these failures cannot be attributed to the legal doc-
trine, which in recent years has consistently rejected the privatization
theory.
The Court's current position on substantive due process ought to be ap-
plauded. The Court has properly rejected the privatization theory that some
Justices have advanced. As noted above, the real debate is over whether it is
appropriate for the government to legislate on the basis of moral norms. The
real divide is not between religious and secular; rather, it is whether it is
proper for the government to enforce moral norms external to the
individual.33 a
The Court's current approach, which accepts the legitimacy of moral
views that may have been influenced in some sense by religion, is the most
desirable position. The principal virtue of this view is that it is receptive to
traditional understandings of morality, which may well provide us with a
superior form of moral knowledge.334 The social consequences of our ac-
ceptance of viewing morality as purely personal certainly suggest that we
should welcome the contribution of more traditional understandings.
The implications of the Court's deferential approach on substantive due
process doctrine ought to be clear. Rejecting the privatization thesis would
affect substantive due process in two ways. First, it would affect whether a
particular right is characterized as "fundamental." Second, it would affect
how the Court evaluates the state interests involved. With respect to the
fundamental right question, accepting a public role for religiously-influenced
moral judgments increases the likelihood that the Court will conclude that
the right involved is not fundamental. A Court that acknowledges the legiti-
macy of a tradition rejecting a particular practice, such as sodomy or abor-
tion, is less likely to view the claimed right as "fundamental." '335 The
333. See Gerard V. Bradley, The Enduring Revolution: Law and Theology in the Secular
State, 39 EMORY L.J. 217, 231 (1990) (book review) ("[D]iscussants of law and religion will
[increasingly] find themselves divided into two camps cutting across religious boundaries, one
called the 'autonomists' and the other 'theonomists,' in the specific sense of adhering to objec-
tive moral norms external to the individual.").
334. Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral Con-
victions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1504 (1989) (book review).
335. Focusing on tradition could also work in the other direction. The Court might rely on
a tradition protecting a particular practice in support of finding a fundamental right. This
might explain why Justice Scalia, usually a critic of expanded notions of substantive due pro-
cess, seems to support Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See Employment Div.,
Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 1601 (1990) (citing Pierce favorably).
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contending positions in Bowers illustrate this point. The Justices in the ma-
jority, who clearly rejected the privatization thesis, thought it was proper to
take into account the long history of religiously-influenced moral opposition
to homosexual sodomy. In contrast, Justice Blackmun evaluated the right in
a more abstract manner, thus avoiding any recourse to a history that he
believed expressed religious intolerance.
As to the state interest question, rejecting the privatization thesis does not
by itself decide the outcome of any case. Accepting a public role for relig-
iously-influenced moral judgments only means that the Court needs to evalu-
ate forthrightly the strength of the state interest involved. The Court will
not be able to dismiss out of hand an asserted state interest because the inter-
est is viewed as religious, as some Justices have done in certain cases.
3 36
Eliminating the use of the "religious" label to dismiss a state interest does
not assist in evaluating the strength of a state interest.3 37 It simply means
that, however that task is undertaken, the Court will need to contend with
state interests that are in some sense traced to "religion."
III. CONCLUSION
An examination of Establishment Clause and substantive due process doc-
trine reveals that the Justices' view of the role of religion in public life has
considerable explanatory power. There are two visions contending for con-
trol. The privatization theory-that religion is a private affair that should
not play a role in public life-has had considerable support on the Court.
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens have consistently sup-
ported this theory.338 Thus, these Justices have typically denied the consti-
336. See supra notes 256-67 and accompanying text.
337. See generally Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential
But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917 (1988); Schneider,
supra note 254.
338. Although his opinion in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), seems generally sup-
portive of a "political" role for religious individuals, Justice Brennan only supported the view
that the Constitution protects these individuals' formal rights to participate in the political
process. In fact, the opinion closes with a very real hostility to the view that we ought to
regard their participation with approval. The opinion even suggests that it might be unconsti-
tutional if religious individuals succeeded in their efforts. See 435 U.S. at 642 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). As Justice Brennan stated:
The antidote which the Constitution provides against zealots who would inject secta-
rianism into the political process is to subject their ideas to refutation in the market-
place of ideas and their platforms to rejection at the polls. With these safeguards, it
is unlikely that they will succeed in inducing government to act along religiously
divisive lines, and, with judicial enforcement of the Establishment Clause, any mea-
sure of success they achieve must be short-lived, at best.
Id. This is not the voice of a man who favors a public role for religion; in fact, he regards it as
pathological. See Gey, supra note 43, at 179. In this regard, note the district court opinion in
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tutionality of both aid to religious institutions and the constitutionality of
legislation that embodies religiously-influenced moral principles. These Jus-
tices are not necessarily hostile to religion and these Justices do not invaria-
bly vote against either religious entities or individuals. Instead, these
Justices are hostile to religion when it takes a public role. As the free exer-
cise cases illustrate, when religion is used to "dissent" from some standard
of public order, these Justices are quite supportive. Despite several enthusi-
astic supporters on the Court, the privatization theory is losing influence
among the Justices. The conservatives on the Court-Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and White-reject the priva-
tization theory, as revealed by their positions on the Establishment Clause
and substantive due process. These Justices accept the constitutionality of
both the inclusion of religious institutions in publicly funded programs and
legislation that embodies religiously-influenced moral principles. With the
conservatives in control of the Court-a situation that is not likely to change
in the foreseeable future-the privatization theory should become less and
less significant, at least as a matter of constitutional law.
In the long run, the privatization thesis may be more troublesome. Some
argue that the culture has moved in the direction of privatized religion. It
may be, as some argue, that the current majority on the Court is lagging
behind the culture. If so, the privatization thesis is likely to resurface in the
next generation. It should, as this Article argues, be resisted.
Clayton, which suggested that although religious groups can participate in the political process
they cannot be successful. Clayton v. Place, 690 F. Supp. 850, 856 (W.D. Mo. 1988), rev'd,
884 F.2d 376, 380-81 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1811 (1990).
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